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The most important determinant of a case’s chances for Supreme Court review
is a circuit split: If two courts of appeals have decided the same issue differ-
ently, review is substantially more likely. But practically every appeal in a
patent case makes its way to a single court—the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. How, then, does the Supreme Court decide whether to grant
certiorari in a patent case?
The petitions for certiorari in the Court’s patent docket suggest an answer:
The Supreme Court looks for splits anyway. These splits, however, are of a
different sort. Rather than consider whether two courts of appeals have de-
cided the same issue differently, the Court looks to whether two fields of law
conflict over the application of the same transsubstantive doctrine. Such “field
splits” are unusual candidates for Supreme Court attention. After all, the
Court’s interest in circuit splits is motivated by a desire for geographic uni-
formity in federal law. But field splits, unlike circuit splits, do not give rise to
forum shopping concerns, do not undermine the predictability of the law, nor
otherwise implicate the legal values that counsel in favor of uniformity. In-
stead, the Supreme Court’s attention to field splits may suggest that legal
universality—consistency across substantive fields of law—is an important
(but unstated) priority in certiorari decisionmaking.
The exercise of this universality interest through certiorari decisions in patent
cases has several consequences for the Supreme Court’s agenda. The Court
must better explain why field splits merit review, and we must better under-
stand how to distinguish those field splits that implicate the Court’s universal-
ity-related concerns from those that do not.
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Introduction
In its 2016 Term, the Supreme Court dedicated nearly ten percent of its
docket to patent cases.1 The Court’s decision to grant review in each of these
cases—as well as almost every other patent case on its docket since 1982—
presents a puzzle. This is because the most important determinant of a
1. The Supreme Court decided six patent cases—Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1664 (2017); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); TC Heartland
LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v.
First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S.
Ct. 734 (2017); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016)—out of a total of sixty-
two opinions released after argument. Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for October Term 2016,
SCOTUSblog 1 (June 28, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
SB_Stat_Pack_2017.06.28.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q8X-MYMR].
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case’s chance of getting on the Supreme Court’s docket is a circuit split:
When two appellate courts have decided the same issue in conflicting ways,
the chances of Supreme Court review jump significantly.2 But practically
every appeal in a patent case makes its way to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.3 This is by design: In 1982, Congress re-
formed the structure of patent appeals to provide uniform and expert deci-
sionmaking in patent litigation.4 This unusual appellate structure
complicates the Supreme Court’s process for setting its agenda. Because the
Federal Circuit is the sole arbiter of patent appeals, there is no possibility of
a circuit split.
How, then, does the Supreme Court decide whether to grant certiorari
to review a patent case? Despite the apparent importance of the Supreme
Court’s docket management systems,5 as well as the recent rapid rise in pat-
ent cases on the Supreme Court’s docket,6 the Court’s agenda-setting pro-
cess for patent cases has received only occasional attention.7
2. E.g., H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United
States Supreme Court 246 (1991) (“Without a doubt, the single most important generaliz-
able factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or ‘split’ in the circuits.”);
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1631–32 (2008) (“[T]he presence
of a conflict remains by far the most important criteria in the Court’s case selection . . . .”); see
also infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction[ ] of an appeal from a final decision of a district
court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating
to patents . . . .”). The Federal Circuit also hears appeals from the Court of Federal Claims, the
Court of International Trade, the International Trade Commission, and the Merit Systems
Protection Board, among others. Id. § 1295(a)(2)–(14). But, as a practical matter, patent ap-
peals constitute a significant majority of its docket. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed.
Circuit, Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2016 (2016), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/the-court/statistics/FY16_Caseload_by_Category.pdf [https://perma.cc/552Z-
J535].
4. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981); S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5–6 (1981).
5. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
6. E.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3
IP Theory 62, 62–63 (2013) (“Starting in around 2000, the Supreme Court became active, if
not even hyperactive, in patent law.”); see also Lawrence Hurley, Divided U.S. Supreme Court
Turns to Less Sensitive IP Cases, Reuters (Sept. 21, 2016, 1:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-court-cases/divided-u-s-supreme-court-turns-to-less-sensitive-ip-cases-idUSKC
N11R0D0 [https://perma.cc/6UDB-UVNQ] (“[The Supreme Court, in its 2016 Term,]
show[ed] a keen interest in more technical cases . . . such as disputes over intellectual
property.”).
7. In addition to the works described infra at notes 8–9 and accompanying text, see,
e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of
Patent Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 28, 29–30 (2007), https://repository.law.u
mich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2206&context=articles (on file with the Michigan Law
Review), which outlines five categories of Supreme Court patent cases, and Gary M. Hoffman
& Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the Recent
Scrutiny in Context and Determining if It Will Continue, 20 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell.
Prop. L. 227, 241 (2010).
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The Supreme Court’s patent-related certiorari decisions seem still to be
strongly influenced by the existence of a split. These splits, however, are of a
different sort. Rather than consider whether two courts of appeals have de-
cided the same issue differently, the Supreme Court appears to consider, at
least in part, whether two fields of law apply the same transsubstantive doc-
trine differently. If the Supreme Court perceives patent law and copyright
law to apply different standards for, say, the defense of laches, then the
Court seems more likely to take the case. Other scholars have observed other
variables that may portend the Supreme Court’s interest in granting certio-
rari to review a patent case. John Duffy, for example, has examined the solic-
itor general’s influence over the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions in
patent cases.8 Timothy Holbrook has likewise described a range of patent-
specific and patent-agnostic explanations for the Court’s interest in patent
law.9 My study of each petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court’s patent
docket from its 1982 Term through its 2016 Term builds from (and expands
upon) this existing work. The new cue for certiorari that I have identified in
this Article—the field split—is a significant, complementary explanation for
the Court’s behavior in patent cases.10
The Supreme Court’s interest in resolving such field splits—conflicts
between substantive applications of (potentially) transsubstantive doc-
trines—merits further scrutiny. After all, the Court’s attention to circuit
splits is usually justified by its preference for geographic uniformity in fed-
eral law. But the usual uniformity-related rationales for reviewing circuit
splits are mismatched to field splits. The legitimacy of the federal law may be
at stake when the meaning of statutes varies state-by-state,11 but such stakes
are not obvious when willfulness means something different in patent law
than it does under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.12 Field splits likewise do
not give rise to forum shopping concerns, nor do they impose any special
burden on multistate actors.13
Why, then, does the Court bother to take these cases—especially when
space on the docket is at a premium?14 The answer must lie outside the usual
8. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 518, 529–38 (2010) (describing the solicitor general’s influence over the certio-
rari process in patent cases).
9. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 65–77.
10. For more on the “cue theory” of certiorari, see infra notes 119, 284 and accompany-
ing text.
11. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text; see also Nichols v. United States, 136 S.
Ct. 1113, 1117 (2016). But see Frost, supra note 2, at 1596–97 (“[O]ur legal system accepts
unequal treatment of similarly-situated individuals as a matter of course.”).
12. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 31, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
356 (2015) (No. 14-1520) (mem.) (granting certiorari), 2015 WL 3898662 [hereinafter Stryker
Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
13. See Frost, supra note 2, at 1596 (summarizing theoretical justifications for
uniformity).
14. See Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost
of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363, 1385 (2006) (“The Court’s docket is a scarce,
indeed precious national resource.”).
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explanations for the Court’s certiorari decisions: Neither a general regard for
uniformity nor these cases’ substantive importance to core patent doctrine
explains the Court’s interest.15 One possibility is that a process defect—
something about the way the Court decides which cases to hear—leads it to
err when making certiorari decisions in patent cases. That possibility,
though potentially intriguing, quickly proves unpersuasive.16
The better hypothesis is that the Supreme Court values legal universal-
ity—general consistency across substantive fields of law—in addition to geo-
graphic uniformity. Three trails of evidence lead to this conclusion. First,
this hypothesis comports with the Court’s general trend for disciplining
“patent exceptionalism.”17 Indeed, the Court’s apparent interest in universal-
ity expands this trend’s ambit: Where other scholars have identified the
Court’s skepticism for patent exceptionalism in its merits decisions, a certio-
rari-centered model explains a broader set of the Court’s decisions. Second,
the universality hypothesis resonates with the Court’s decisions beyond its
patent docket. Scholars have noted the Supreme Court’s concern for excep-
tionalism across doctrinal areas, including foreign relations, health care, im-
migration, labor, and tax.18 Indeed, the Court has taken rules developed in
15. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16
Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 330, 331 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s recent decisions, though
substantial in number, have rarely involved the fundamental legal doctrines that directly en-
sure the inventiveness of patents and regulate their scope.”); see also Dan Epps & Ian Samuel,
In Recess #4: Stone Soup, First Mondays 56:45–57:30 (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www
.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2017/9/11/in-recess-4-stone-soup [https://perma.cc/VE39-TRQG]
(interviewing William Jay, who explains that the Supreme Court’s recent patent cases do not
present questions of “hardcore patent law” but rather focus on questions of “procedure,”
“venue,” and “statutory interpretation”).
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 61 (2014);
Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1453–61 (2016);
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 Duke L.J. Online 149
(2016), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=dlj_online
[https://perma.cc/5W59-EXAR]; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal
Court, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1791, 1817–18 (2013). But cf. James Donald Smith, Foreword,
Patent Exceptionalism with Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 Duke L.J. 1551, 1552–53 (2016)
(suggesting a historical basis for patent exceptionalism).
18. See, respectively, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of For-
eign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897, 1935 (2015) (foreign relations); Abigail R. Mon-
crieff, Commentary, Understanding the Failure of Health-Care Exceptionalism in the Supreme
Court’s Obamacare Decision, 142 Chest 559 (2012) (health care); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigra-
tion in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68
Okla. L. Rev. 57, 111 (2015) (immigration); Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The
Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 Geo. Immigr.
L.J. 313, 356 (2012) (same); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114
Mich. L. Rev. 169 (2015) (labor); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies
Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517 (1994) (tax); and Kristin E. Hickman, Re-
sponse, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 Tex. L. Rev.
See Also 89, 108–10 (2010) (same).
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patent law and applied them in other doctrinal contexts.19 This explanation
thus situates the Court’s patent decisions within a more general jurispruden-
tial framework. Finally, a universality-centered explanation correlates with
changes on the Court that might explain the emergence of new priorities,
namely, the appointment of new justices.
To the extent that the Court’s apparent practice identifies such an insti-
tutional interest in universality, several implications may follow.
First, the Court’s willingness to review a field split alone is itself notable.
It suggests the sheer strength of that institutional interest. The Court’s strin-
gent standard for certiorari is sometimes satisfied by a decision to craft an
exceptional legal rule—suggesting that, at least in patent cases, the Court’s
concern for legal universality is at least as important as other inputs to its
certiorari decisionmaking process, including geographic uniformity and the
views of the solicitor general. Indeed, the Court has even granted certiorari
over the federal government’s objections to resolve a field split.20
Second, though the Court’s decisions always have the effect of imposing
a uniform legal rule (a rule that is constant across jurisdictions), the Court
does not always impose a universal legal rule (a rule that is constant across
fields of law). Rather, the Court will sometimes preserve varying standards
for, say, willful conduct. When, then, does the Court prefer universality? A
closer examination suggests that the Court’s concern peaks where it per-
ceives a possible threat to the judiciary’s neutrality and legitimacy. The
Court seems to prefer neutral rules that deny judges the ability to favor
certain substantive regimes and to thereby make political choices.21 Hence,
the Court’s regard for universality is more likely to give way, on the merits,
in the face of a doctrine-specific statute or other, preexisting doctrinal
variation.
Third, universality plays no obvious part in the Court’s certiorari deci-
sions beyond its patent docket.22 Indeed, the Court’s apparent disinterest in
reviewing field splits beyond patent law may highlight some important
weaknesses in this certiorari standard. Unlike geographic uniformity, the
Court’s apparent interest in legal universality is not connected to any con-
gressional grant of discretionary jurisdiction. Moreover, these universality-
implicating patent cases may both fail to implicate the primary doctrines
that regulate a patent’s scope and distract from those important cases that
do. Perhaps the Supreme Court sees its interest in universality—articulated
only, if at all, in its merits decisions—as a sufficient basis for granting dis-
cretionary review. But that is a stark departure from past certiorari practice,
19. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 301–303 and accompanying text.
21. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L.
Rev. 1191, 1229–30 (2014); see Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 594–95 (1963); cf.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179–80 (1989).
22. See infra notes 317–319 and accompanying text.
June 2018] Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle 1351
one which merits further explanation, especially in light of its apparently
narrow, patent-centered scope.
This study thus helps to illuminate the bundle of interests underlying
the Court’s concern for universality—namely, neutrality and legitimacy (as
well as, perhaps, efficiency). This study also helps practitioners—petitioners
and respondents alike—pinpoint petitions that are more likely to succeed
(or fail). It also helps the courts of appeals, most notably the Federal Circuit,
decide cases in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s apparent (if
unstated) values. And it suggests that the Supreme Court clarify the bases for
certiorari in its patent docket.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. First, I set out an introductory exam-
ple—Samsung v. Apple—that both highlights the Court’s apparent interest
in field splits and illustrates how the uncertain contours of this interest may
affect the Court’s patent-related decisions. Second, I expand from the open-
ing example to describe the Article’s titular puzzle in more detail. In particu-
lar, I highlight the discord between the institutional values that typically
inform the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions and a set of patent cases
that has come to occupy a prominent place on the Court’s docket. Third, I
identify a feature I call a field split—an alleged conflict among fields of law
over the application of the same transsubstantive doctrine—that seems
common to these cases. In doing so, I describe three general categories of
field splits: splits across related fields, splits across unrelated fields, and outli-
ers. Fourth, I consider why the field split may explain so many of the Court’s
certiorari decisions. One possibility—easily dismissed—is that the Court
conflates field splits with circuit splits and thereby grants certiorari on a
mistaken premise. Another, more persuasive possibility is that the Court’s
preference to hear such cases connects to an unstated institutional concern
for legal universality. Finally, drawing on the taxonomy of field splits de-
scribed above, I explore some implications of such an institutional concern
for universality.
I. An Introductory Example: Samsung v. Apple
In 2016, the Supreme Court issued a frustratingly vague decision in
Samsung v. Apple, a case about damages for design patent infringement.23
Commentators complained that the Court’s “opinion tells us nothing at all
about the correct answer to this case, because it offers no guidance . . . .
[T]he opinion goes out of its way to emphasize that the justices intend to
offer no direction on how to address or resolve the [case’s] definitional
problem.”24 Such criticism begs scrutiny: How did the Court issue such an
open-ended opinion?
23. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
24. Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Tread Narrow Path in Rejecting $400 Million
Award for Samsung’s Infringement of Apple’s Cellphone Design Patents, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 6,
2016, 4:09 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/opinion-analysis-justices-tread-narrow-
path-in-rejecting-400-million-award-for-samsungs-infringement-of-apples-cellphone-design-
patents/ [https://perma.cc/KP73-LW5F]. For similar criticism, see Gugliuzza, supra note 15, at
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It helps to begin with the petition for a writ of certiorari, which is the
primary mechanism by which almost any case earns a place on the Supreme
Court’s docket. Though the Court once had mandatory jurisdiction over
every case properly before it, Congress has slowly given the Court increasing
discretion—in the form of the writ of certiorari—to choose the cases it will
decide.25 The Judiciary Act of 1891, for example, made the decisions of the
courts of appeals final in limited classes of cases, including those arising
under the federal patent laws.26 The Supreme Court could, however, review
such decisions if it granted a writ of certiorari to bring the case within its
discretionary docket.27 Congress has since expanded this discretion to almost
encompass the Court’s entire caseload.28
Samsung’s petition asked the Supreme Court to decide two questions.
First, it asked the Court to decide the extent to which certain aspects of a
device—such as the distinctively rounded corners of an iPhone—may be
subject to design patent protection.29 Second, Samsung asked the Court to
decide the proper measure of damages for design patent infringement.30
In the petition’s first question, Samsung contrasted the design patent
statute, which limits protection to “ornamental” features, with the Federal
Circuit’s decision, which, in Samsung’s view, enlarged the statute’s scope “to
include conceptual and functional features,” such as soft corners, “that are
beyond legitimate design-patent protection.”31 Samsung’s contention—that
it should be free to manufacture a device in the shape of a rounded rectangle
without facing infringement liability—essentially asked the Court to clarify
the boundaries of what, exactly, may be protected by a design patent.
345 (“[T]he Court refused even to offer any legal guidance to the lower courts about how to
determine what, precisely, is the relevant article.” (emphasis omitted)); Adam Liptak & Vindu
Goel, Supreme Court Gives Samsung a Reprieve in Apple Patent Case, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/technology/samsung-apple-smartphone-patent-
supreme-court.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (The Supreme Court did not
“decisively resolv[e] the case,” did not “offer . . . specific guidance,” but rather, “punted.”
(quoting interview with Professor Mark A. Lemley, Director of the Stanford Program in Law,
Science, and Technology)); and Melissa J. Sachs, Lawyers Weigh in on Design Patent Defeat in
Apple/Samsung Smartphone Case, Westlaw J. Computer & Internet, Dec. 16, 2016, at *1
(similar).
25. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles,
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 7–14 (2011) (detailing “a brief history of certiorari”).
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 828.
27. See Watts, supra note 25, at 11.
28. See Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice § 2.1, at 76 (10th ed.
2013). I describe the Court’s exercise of this discretion in more detail infra, in Section II.A.
One notable exception is the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over direct appeals from three-
judge district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
29. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1453
(2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 15-777), 2015 WL 10013702 [hereinafter Samsung
Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21.
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In the petition’s second question, Samsung challenged the $399 million
damages award, which accounted for its entire profits from the infringing
devices.32 Samsung asserted that this damages award “flies in the face of
well-settled tort principles” applied in various fields, such as “securities law,
employment law, RICO, and the Violence Against Women Act.”33 In partic-
ular, Samsung contended that the Federal Circuit had erred by awarding
Apple all of Samsung’s profits, thereby contravening the “cardinal principle”
of damages law that compensation be limited to the injury actually caused
by the violation.34 This “conflic[t]” among fields of law on the application of
“background principles of causation and equity” counseled in favor of certi-
orari.35 Stated simply, Samsung asserted that the apparent split between pat-
ent law, on the one hand, and securities law and employment law (among
others), on the other, meant that the Supreme Court should grant the peti-
tion for certiorari.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case—but limited its certiorari
grant to the damages-related question.36 In its opening merits brief, Sam-
sung contended that damages should be limited to the harm caused by its
infringement.37 It reiterated its argument that the Federal Circuit’s ap-
proach—which awarded Apple damages equaling Samsung’s total profits on
the infringing devices—marked a “wholesale departure from traditional
principles of causation and equity.”38 Samsung argued that the causation
rule, which the Federal Circuit had rejected, was part of a “universal regime”
that applied in a variety of contexts: The rule not only applied to cases aris-
ing under securities regulations, employment law, and assorted criminal
statutes, as Samsung had alleged in its petition, it also “universally gov-
ern[ed] . . . elsewhere in intellectual property law.”39 Hence, in Samsung’s
view, it should have been held liable for only those losses that Apple could
trace to Samsung’s infringement.
Apple countered with an argument it made at the certiorari stage. It
contended that the apparent inconsistency between design patents and these
other areas of law was illusory. There was, in Apple’s view, no “conflict[ ]”
on the causation principle of damages because the design patent context was
easily distinguished40: The damages statute at issue, 35 U.S.C. § 289, “cre-
ate[d] a design patent infringement remedy that differed from” that which
32. Samsung Elecs. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433–34 (2016).
33. Samsung Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 32–33 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 33 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978)).
35. Id. at 32–33.
36. Samsung, 136 S. Ct. 1453 (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted limited to Question 2 presented by the petition.”).
37. Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777), 2016 WL 6599922
[hereinafter Samsung Brief for Petitioners].
38. Id. at 35.
39. Id. at 37–38.
40. Brief in Opposition at 32, Samsung, 136 S. Ct. 1453 (No. 15-777), 2016 WL 6599923
[hereinafter Samsung Brief in Opposition].
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background causation principles might otherwise imply.41 The federal gov-
ernment agreed. In its amicus brief on the merits, the solicitor general ex-
plained that “[t]he whole point” of § 289 “is to provide a measure of
recovery different from, and in many cases more expansive than, the award
that traditional causation principles would produce.”42
Samsung relented: At oral argument, Samsung “abandoned [the] the-
ory” that damages for design patent infringement ought to be limited to the
profit caused by and attributable to its infringement.43 Though it is not en-
tirely clear why Samsung waived this argument at such a late stage, this stra-
tegic decision seems to have affected the Court’s ultimate decision in the
case. Without the causation rule to steer its analysis, the Court’s opinion
appears rudderless in its search for a limiting principle on damages.44 To be
sure, the Court explained that § 289 awards the patent holder the “total
profit” from the infringing “article of manufacture.”45 And the Court re-
jected the Federal Circuit’s rule that the “end product sold to the consumer”
is the only relevant article of manufacture for these purposes, explaining that
the statutory phrase may, in some circumstances, also refer to “a component
of the end product.”46 But it went no further. The Court expressly declined
“to set out a test for identifying the relevant article of manufacture.”47 When
is the relevant “article of manufacture” the product sold? When is it an in-
ternal component? How should a court apportion the profits when a com-
ponent is at issue? These questions, critical to the dispute between Apple and
Samsung, are unanswered. The causation rule offered one possible resolu-
tion to these queries: By applying a general causation-in-fact principle, the
41. Brief for Respondent at 33, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777), 2016 WL 4073686
[hereinafter Samsung Brief for Respondent]; Samsung Brief in Opposition, supra note 40, at 33
(“[R]emedies governed by different statutory provisions or the common law cannot justify
disregarding § 289’s plain language and clear legislative history.” (emphasis omitted)); see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 26–27, Samsung, 137
S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777), 2016 WL 3194218 [hereinafter Samsung Amicus Brief for the United
States] (“Congress deviated from that general rule of causation because it was concerned that
applying that principle to design patents would often under-compensate patentees.”).
42. Samsung Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 41, at 15.
43. Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434 n.2 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 6 (No. 15-
777)).
44. To be sure, it is not at all obvious that Samsung’s strategic decision is the reason why
the Court declined to endorse the causation rule. Even if Samsung had not abandoned this
argument, the Court might have been persuaded by the arguments advanced by Apple and the
solicitor general. My point, elaborated in greater detail infra, is that the simple choice that the
Court thought it had—between the general causation rule, on the one hand, and the Federal
Circuit’s special rule, on the other—was illusory. This unexpected complication seems to have
affected the Court’s ability to offer useful guidance on the question. This is true no matter
whether the complication arose because Samsung abandoned the argument or, as Apple ar-
gued, because § 289 supersedes the causation rule. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying
text, and Section III.B.2.
45. Samsung, 137 U.S. at 434–35.
46. Id. at 434–36.
47. Id. at 436.
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Court might have limited damages to those marginal profits directly attribu-
table to Samsung’s infringement.48 But absent this option (grounded, in
Samsung’s earlier view, in background principles of damages and equity) the
Court struggled to guide the Federal Circuit’s analysis on remand. The
Court acknowledged that the solicitor general proposed a different test
(without describing it), but it declined to adopt any alternative “in the ab-
sence of adequate briefing by the parties.”49
This example illuminates several features of the Supreme Court’s recent
approach to its patent docket. For one, the views of the solicitor general (an
especially important amicus, particularly at the certiorari stage) cannot ex-
plain the Court’s decision to grant the petition. Though the Supreme Court
has often sought the solicitor general’s opinion about potentially important
patent petitions before granting certiorari,50 it declined to do so in this case.
Hence, to the extent that the solicitor general’s views signal an issue’s impor-
tance to substantive patent doctrine—one criterion relevant to the Supreme
Court’s decision to grant certiorari—this petition for a writ of certiorari
seems (on this metric) to fall short of the Supreme Court’s usual bar.51
Moreover, because of the Federal Circuit’s national scope, the petition does
not implicate the Supreme Court’s oft-cited concerns for uniformity in fed-
eral law. Along these two critical axes, there is little that obviously distin-
guishes the petition as certworthy.
But one other possibility may seem intriguing. Samsung’s petition for
certiorari asserted that the Federal Circuit created a rift between damages
rules for design patent cases and the remedies principles applied elsewhere
in federal law—in securities law, in employment law, and in criminal law.52
This distinctive feature of the petition offers one possible ground for the
Court’s decision to grant certiorari. The Court’s attention to such a rift
48. Justice Kennedy suggested at oral argument that a “sensible” rule would apportion
damages according to a market study of the extent to which the infringing aspect of the design
affected consumer choice. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-
777); see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 26 (Am. Law
Inst. 2010) (“Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred
absent the conduct.”); cf. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1112–13 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (applying a similar rule in the context of an allegedly infringing
feature of Microsoft’s Outlook software).
49. Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 436. But see Mann, supra note 24 (“[I]t may come as a surprise
to Apple and Samsung that their briefs weren’t ‘adequate’ to shed more light on the correct
answer to their dispute.”).
50. Duffy, supra note 8, at 529–30.
51. See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the
Solicitor General, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 237, 281 (2009) (explaining that the Court will often
call for the views of the Solicitor General (CVSGs) in cases that “involve complex regulatory
and statutory schemes” to determine whether the issues presented are “of sufficient impor-
tance to merit review”); see also infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
52. Samsung Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 32–33 (citations omitted).
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might be explained, for example, by an interest in transsubstantivity or,
more generally, universality.53
Moreover, the Court’s ultimate decision in the case may reinforce the
conclusion that its decision to grant certiorari was motivated, at least in
part, by such legal universality concerns: If the Court granted certiorari to
resolve the rift between damages principles for design patent infringement
and other areas of law, then its belated discovery (aided by Samsung’s last-
minute concession) that the statute itself embodies a unique rule may have
upset the Court’s initial view of the case—leading, ultimately, to the open-
ended opinion described earlier (and, perhaps, some regret over the decision
to grant review).54 The Court thought the case presented a choice between a
general doctrine and the Federal Circuit’s specialized rule, but, in the end,
the case asked the Court to craft a unique, context-sensitive rule under
§ 289. The Court demurred on this more technical (and more difficult)
question, noting a lack of adequate briefing.55
This example thus suggests an institutional value that is not typically
associated with the Supreme Court’s certiorari practice: Neither uniformity
concerns, nor the attention of the solicitor general, nor the fundamental
importance of the case explains the Court’s interest. It may ask too much to
extrapolate about the Court’s general priorities from this one example. In-
deed, the universality hypothesis seems, at first blush, incomplete: If that
theory explains the Supreme Court’s decision to review the damages-related
question presented in Samsung’s petition, why did the Court decline to hear
Samsung’s first (and more foundational) question? After all, Samsung con-
tended that the Federal Circuit’s ruling regarding the proper scope of design
53. I prefer the term universality (which may date as far back as to Aristotle) to represent
the breadth of the Court’s interest. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, L. & Con-
temp. Probs., Summer 1993, at 53, 71 (quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1137b, in 2
The Complete Works of Aristotle 1729, 1796 (Jonathan Barnes ed. & W.D. Ross trans.,
1984)); see also Lee, supra note 17, at 1418–21 (describing the “intellectual foundation of ‘legal
universalism’ ”). The term transsubstantivity, for example, has historically applied to rules of
procedure, see Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 Yale L.J. 718, 718 (1975), and that term has been used by recent scholars to refer to
“process law”—a range of “[p]rocedural, administrative, and interpretative doctrine [that]
regulate the legal processes of public administration and court-based litigation,” Marcus, supra
note 21, at 1197. The scope of the Court’s interest described here extends beyond process law
to include remedies, principles, and definitions for states of mind, among others. Other schol-
ars have referred to similar concepts by other terms, such as generality, see, e.g., id. at 1214;
Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. Va. L. Rev. 217, 218–24 (2004) (describing
the spectrum between “generality” and “particularism”), or coherence, see, e.g., Thomas C.
Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 495–96 (1996) (book review)
(describing “Langdellian legal theory” as emphasizing a system in which “law [is] systematic,
its rules descending deductively from a small number of coherently interrelated fundamental
concepts” (emphasis omitted)); see also J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J. 105, 115–16 (1993); Amanda L.
Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1389, 1406 (2005).
54. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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patents likewise “create[d] tension with other areas of intellectual property
law,” including trademark and copyright law.56
A more complete examination of the Supreme Court’s patent docket
addresses both objections. A closer look at the complete range of the Court’s
decisions to grant certiorari in patent cases since 1982 appears to corrobo-
rate the universality hypothesis drawn from Samsung v. Apple. Moreover, a
more complete understanding of the nature and scope of the Court’s univer-
sality value—and hence, the sorts of field splits that are implicated—may
help to resolve the open issue about Samsung’s first question.57
II. Certiorari’s Patent Puzzle
A. Certiorari and Circuit Splits
The Supreme Court has wide discretion, in the form of the writ of certi-
orari, to design its own docket. The Court’s exercise of this discretion is a
matter of great practical consequence and scholarly interest. Justice Brennan,
for example, wrote that case selection “is second to none in importance.”58
The decision to take a case simultaneously mirrors society’s “everchanging
concerns” and shapes the nation’s political, social, and economic agenda.59
This is true not only for the Court’s high-profile cases but also for those
cases that may be less politically charged. For example, the Court’s decision
to hear Samsung v. Apple60—its first case about design patents in over a
century—both reflects the growth in that intellectual property regime and
affects the extent to which design patents may be an effective form of intel-
lectual property protection in the future.61
The Supreme Court’s ability to choose its own cases is also a scholarly
aid. Case selection decisions help to reveal institutional preferences: The
56. Samsung Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 23.
57. See infra Section V.A and note 296.
58. William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 473, 477 (1973).
59. Id. at 483; see Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and
Public Opinion: Comparing Experimental Observational Methods, 45 J. Leg. Stud. 223, 224
(2016) (“Court rulings can change national public opinion, even on controversial issues that
have been extensively debated beforehand and on which Americans have relatively firm
views.”). But see generally Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s,
120 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 41 (2006) (“But when we look at the world as ordinary Americans see it,
we begin to understand that even when the Supreme Court is at its most influential and most
visible, the American people quite often have other things on their minds.”).
60. Samsung Elecs., Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
61. See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2012: Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade Secret
Cases, 11 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 173, 183 (2013); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear
Samsung Appeal on Apple Patent Award, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/03/22/technology/supreme-court-to-hear-samsung-appeal-on-apple-patent-award
.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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decision to grant or deny a petition is one expression of the Court’s “subjec-
tive notions of what is important or appropriate for review.”62
Notably, however, the Court’s decisions to grant or deny a petition are
only rarely accompanied by an opinion or statement explaining its action.63
The Supreme Court’s opinions on the merits of a case sometimes explain its
decision to grant certiorari in the first instance—though such intermittent
explanations offer no hope to litigants whose petitions were denied.
Outside the occasional statement in a merits opinion and the rare “cert-
sent,”64 the Court’s only other articulation of its certiorari-related priorities
is in Supreme Court Rule 10. That Rule offers three categories, which “al-
though neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indi-
cate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same impor-
tant matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that con-
flicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or
of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an impor-
tant question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court.65
62. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding
to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 313, 313, 318 (2009)
[hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda] (quoting Eugene Gressman, The
National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J. 253, 255 (1973)); see Doris Marie Provine,
Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court 2 (1980) (“Case selection . . . pro-
vides a good indication of the decision-making priorities of the Supreme Court . . . .”); Mar-
garet Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 389, 421–22 (2004) [herein-
after Cordray & Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari] (“[A] Justice’s feel for when an issue is
sufficiently important to merit plenary review is necessarily informed by his or her conception
of the essential nature of the Supreme Court’s responsibilit[ies] . . . .” (quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. Pol. 1062, 1073 (2009) (“Justices have nearly total
discretion to decide which cases the Court will hear, meaning they have freedom to pursue
their raw policy goals . . . .”); cf. Bert I. Huang & Tejas N. Narechania, Judicial Priorities, 163 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1719, 1721 (2015) (observing courts’ revealed preferences through their decisions
whether to publish an opinion in a case).
63. See Provine, supra note 62, at 42.
64. See Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 Yale
L.J.F. 601, 605–606 (2012), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1071_8a9amhrm.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7EW9-BEMA] (defining “certsent”—a dissent from the denial of certiorari).
65. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
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Though scholars have criticized Rule 10 for being “hopelessly indetermi-
nate,” or even “intentionally . . . murky,” some themes can be sifted out of
its criteria.66
First, Rule 10 indicates that the Court demands more than an incorrect
decision before granting certiorari. It is not enough that the decision is
wrong on the merits.67 This aspect of the Court’s practice is reflected in
Justice Brandeis’s oft-repeated quip that “it is more important that the ap-
plicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”68 The Court may
decline to intervene, even where it suspects a decision or rule of law is incor-
rect, for the sake of finality or predictability (among other considerations).
Hence, to clear the Supreme Court’s high bar for certiorari, a case must
present some additional, distinctive feature.
The predominant such feature is, as Rule 10 suggests, the presence of a
“conflict” among lower courts on the question presented. Several qualitative
and quantitative studies have confirmed the importance of such splits to the
Supreme Court’s certiorari decisionmaking process. For example, H.W.
Perry, in his seminal work, concludes that “the single most important gener-
alizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or
‘split’ in the circuits.”69 The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice like-
wise notes that in the 1993 Term, “approximately 70 percent of the cases in
which certiorari was granted presented a conflict.”70 Several additional
66. Respectively, Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Su-
preme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 790 (1984), and
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the
Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1723 (2000) (quoting Perry, supra note 2, at 34). See
also The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 154 (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“The Justices have been intentionally vague as to what makes a
case certworthy. Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States purports to
offer criteria, but it is of little help.” (cleaned up)).
67. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1780 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e are not, and for well over a century have not
been, a court of error correction.”); Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116
Mich. L. Rev. 705, 716 (2018) (noting the Court’s general “refusal to engage in error correc-
tion”); cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Ivy v. Morath, 136 S. Ct. 2545
(2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 15-486), 2016 WL 2937223 [hereinafter Ivy Amicus
Brief for the United States] (arguing that the “case does not warrant [the Supreme] Court’s
review,” notwithstanding the government’s belief that the Court of Appeals’ decision was in-
correct, because that decision “is fact-dependent and does not conflict with any decision of
this Court, another federal court of appeals, or a state court of last resort”).
68. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also Sheet Metal Workers, Int’l Ass’n v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
69. Perry, supra note 2, at 246; see Provine, supra note 62, at 39 (“[C]onflict ‘remains
by far the most frequent ground for granting the writ.’ ” (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term 1933, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 238,
267 (1934))).
70. Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 241.
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empirical studies reinforce the conclusion that such splits dominate the
Court’s agenda.71
Not all alleged splits, however, are created equal. Rather, the Court’s
attention is typically focused on sharp divides among the courts of appeals
on the same issue.72 It is not enough, in the usual case, that two cases simply
“conflict in principle” because similar terms have different meanings.73 Pur-
ported splits that may in fact be resolved by distinctions in statutory lan-
guage, or by their different factual or doctrinal contexts, are significantly less
likely to be reviewed.74 Hence, a petitioner alleging a circuit split must hur-
dle a high bar to demonstrate that her case satisfies Rule 10’s standards.
The Court’s focus on such clear divisions among the lower courts re-
flects one of the institution’s core values: It is acutely attuned to geographic
uniformity concerns in federal law. The Court’s own opinions, explaining
decisions to resolve “longstanding disagreement[s]” among the courts of ap-
peals, expressly reflect its view that “it is important to have a uniform inter-
pretation of federal law.”75 Individual justices have likewise commented that
the Court’s “principal responsibility under current practice . . . is to ensure
the integrity and uniformity of federal law.”76 Stated simply, preserving
71. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 403, 415–16 (showing results for 1993–1995 in a study that focuses exclusively on
petitions from the federal Courts of Appeals); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 901, 910 (1984) (“[T]here is
little doubt that the Supreme Court in its 1947–1976 terms has been significantly influenced in
making certiorari decisions by factors of conflict. Moreover . . . conflict is far and away the
most significant predictor of certiorari decisions for [the Vinson and Warren] Courts.”);
David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 981–82 (2007) (book review).
72. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore,
135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-520) (granting certiorari), 2014 WL 5762869.
73. Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 242; Ulmer, supra note 71, at 906; see also
Perry, supra note 2, at 128 (explaining that significant effort is dedicated to “trying to deter-
mine if there is indeed the conflict that the petition alleges”).
74. Ulmer, supra note 71, at 906 (finding “no significant correlations between claimed
conflict,” as compared to genuine conflict, “and the Court’s decisions on certiorari”). But cf.
Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.4, at 245 (“Justices may not always agree as to whether
there is a ‘true,’ ‘genuine,’ or ‘current’ conflict.”).
75. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 273, 276 (2013). Other decisions
reflecting the view that the Court’s certiorari practice is driven, at least in part, by uniformity
concerns include Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995); Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59,
67–68 (1977); Tidewater Oil Co v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 170 (1972); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965); Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923); and Lau Ow
Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 58 (1892); Cf. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135
S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (“[C]ertiorari jurisdiction exists to clarify the law . . . .”).
76. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rob-
erts, for example, has said that the Court’s “main job” is to ensure that “federal law is uniform
across the country.” Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN 18:05–18:25 (June 19, 2009),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?286078-1/supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts&start=1077
[https://perma.cc/CNL3-PVJG]. Likewise, Justice Kagan recently said that the Court “think[s]
that . . . [citizens] are entitled to the same body of federal law as somebody who lives in
another state.” Chi.-Kent College of Law at Ill. Inst. of Tech., A Conversation with Justice Elena
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uniformity in federal law has been an essential aspect of the Supreme
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction since its earliest applications.77
The Court’s emphasis on geographic uniformity reflects a bundle of
underlying concerns.78 First, uniformity helps to ensure that the law treats
Kagan, Oct. 16, 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, YouTube 23:50–24:05 (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=MWKA79-3vHA [https://perma.cc/
2GJW-DUU5]. Justice White similarly wrote that the Court should focus on “provid[ing]
some degree of coherence and uniformity in federal law.” Byron R. White, The Work of the
Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. St. B.J. 346, 349 (1982). Justice
O’Connor also expressed this view. See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law
211 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). Chief Justice Rehnquist, too. See William H. Rehnquist, The
Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (1986).
77. See Robert L. Stern, Comment, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 465, 465 (1953) (citing Reynolds Robertson & Francis R. Kirkam, Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States § 322, at 629 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B.
Kurland eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 1951) (1936); Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman,
Supreme Court Practice 101 (1st ed. 1950)); see also the cases cited supra note 75; cf. Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (Story, J.) (“[The Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction highlights the] the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of deci-
sions throughout the whole United States,” as disuniformity “would be truly deplorable.”).
This view is rooted in the Judges’ Bill of 1925, which vastly expanded the Court’s certio-
rari jurisdiction: “[S]ome believe that the legislation was based on an explicit commitment
that the Justices made to Congress to protect the uniformity of federal law in return for Con-
gress’ ceding the Court so much control over case selection.” Cordray & Cordray, The Philoso-
phy of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 436–437.
78. These underlying concerns help to explain why even some clear circuit splits are not
reviewed: If, for example, an issue does not arise frequently enough to cause forum shopping,
to create unpredictability, or to undermine the law’s legitimacy, then a split on that question is
unlikely to be important enough to merit review. See Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at
242; Stern, supra note 77, at 470–72.
These concerns may likewise help to explain some grants of certiorari even absent a
circuit split. Consider the Court’s distaste for forum shopping. The Court’s decision to grant
the petition in TC Heartland, which alleged “rampant forum shopping” in patent cases, may
be informed by this underlying interest, the absence of a circuit split notwithstanding. See
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17–22, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
137 S. Ct. 614. (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 16-341), 2016 WL 4983136.
To be sure, the Court’s focus on uniformity is neither unassailable nor exclusive. Justice
Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, for example, both have suggested that the benefits of percola-
tion—experimentation with different legal rules across the circuits—can outweigh the costs of
some period of disuniformity. Cordray & Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 62,
at 438. Justice Gorsuch has also hinted that he favors the benefits of percolation. See Maslenjak
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (noting that “the experience of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and
circuit benches, [can] yield insights (or reveal pitfalls)”). But even this view suggests that the
Supreme Court should eventually intervene to establish a uniform federal rule based on re-
gional experiences. Amanda Frost has also criticized the Supreme Court’s project of promoting
“uniformity for [uniformity’s] own sake,” arguing that the endeavor is unnecessarily costly
and that disuniformity may be preferable in some instances. Frost, supra note 2, at 1571.
For a more detailed description of the uniformity rationale (as well as critiques of the
rationale), see Cordray & Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 436–37, and,
more generally, Frost, supra note 2.
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citizens equally.79 In Nichols v. United States, for example, the Court granted
certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict that subjected a resident of Kansas City,
Missouri, and a resident of Kansas City, Kansas, to two different legal rules.80
Moreover, such equal treatment may help to protect the legitimacy of the
law and of the federal courts by avoiding a public impression of
arbitrariness.81 Second, uniformity facilitates predictability.82 Third, uni-
formity dampens forum shopping.83 Finally, uniformity reduces costs for
multistate actors.84
Rule 10 also indicates that the Court does not hear only those cases
implicating uniformity values. First, it occasionally grants petitions where a
court has “so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of th[e] Court’s supervisory power”
or where a lower court has failed to follow the Supreme Court’s instruc-
tions.85 Though the Supreme Court is, as noted above, famously uncon-
cerned with regular error correction,86 it will occasionally grant a petition to
ensure accuracy and fidelity to its precedents. Such cases are often addressed
in a summary reversal—a brief decision that “simultaneously grant[s] the
petition and decide[s] the case on the merits.”87 This device is reserved for
“situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute,
and the decision below is clearly in error,”88 and it appears to be deployed in
79. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 76, at 211 (noting the “unfairness” that may result
from disuniformity); see also Benjamin Johnson & Keith E. Whittington, Why Does the Su-
preme Court Uphold So Many Laws?, U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (draft at 7–8).
80. 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1117 (2016).
81. See, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for
Certification?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1316 (2010) (“[B]oth fairness and rule-of-law
principles strongly dictate that uniform rules should be a cornerstone of our federal scheme.”);
see also Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 38–40 (1994).
82. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece-
dents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 850–52 (1994); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial
Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 Cornell L. Rev.
587, 622 (2009); Frost, supra note 2 at 1600.
83. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693, 754–56 (1995); see also Judicial Conference
of the U.S., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 124–25 (1990), https://
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVY2-LZYD].
84. See Hellman, supra note 83, at 748–54; see also Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
supra note 83, at 124–25.
85. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), 10(c); see William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 36 (2015) (quoting same in discussion of the Court’s
summary reversal practice); see also James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016).
86. Sup. Ct. R. 10; see City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1780
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e are not, and for well over
a century have not been, a court of error correction.”); Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.17,
at 278.
87. Baude, supra note 85, at 19.
88. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
June 2018] Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle 1363
practice in connection with only a limited set of issues.89 Second, the Court
is also sometimes persuaded that a case presents “an important question of
federal law” that demands its attention, even absent a circuit split.90 Such
exceptionally important cases, described in more detail below, often present
questions about federal power, national policy, or constitutional rights.91
But regardless whether the uniformity rationale is the exclusive explana-
tion for its certiorari decisions, or even whether the Court’s focus on geo-
graphic uniformity is desirable, it remains the dominant and most widely
accepted explanation for a substantial majority of the Court’s decisions to
grant certiorari.
B. Uniformity and the Patent Puzzle
The Court’s emphasis on uniformity presents a puzzle for patent cases.
This is because practically every patent appeal nationwide is directed to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.92 Hence, there is almost no possi-
bility that a circuit split will present in a patent case.93 This is intentional.
Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to ensure a uniform approach
to patent adjudication.94 Where it was previously possible for two circuits to
89. Baude, supra note 85, at 31–33, 39, 41–45 (describing four general categories of
summary reversals: (1) refusals to enforce arbitration agreements, (2) failures to give district
courts sentencing discretion, (3) grants of writs of habeas corpus, and (4) determinations of
liability under Section 1983); see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106
Calif. L. Rev. 101, 139 (2018) (adding fifth category: denials of qualified immunity).
90. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, 35, FERC v. Elec. Power
Supply Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 14-840), 2015 WL
217293 [hereinafter FERC Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (arguing that the case presented a
“question of substantial national importance” over which “a circuit conflict [wa]s unlikely to
develop”).
91. See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying text.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
93. One notable exception arises where circuits disagree over whether the Federal Circuit
has jurisdiction over a particular case. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 803 (1988) (“This case requires that we decide a peculiar jurisdictional battle be-
tween the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Each court has adamantly disavowed jurisdiction over this case.”). Congress, however,
has incrementally expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over patent cases, see, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 81 (2011), making such jurisdictional disputes less likely. But com-
pare Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 506 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the
Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction encompasses a Walker Process antitrust claim), and Ritz
Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 463 F. App’x 921, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (similar), with
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 684–85 (2d Cir. 2009) (the Sec-
ond Circuit has jurisdiction over the Walker Process antitrust claim).
94. See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner, Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16 Chi.-Kent J.
Intell. Prop. 326, 326 (2017) (“[T]he raison d’etre for the establishment of the Federal Cir-
cuit was to provide uniformity and certainty in patent law.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law
Federalism, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 21–24.
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reach conflicting conclusions even about a single patent’s validity, Con-
gress’s intercession helps to avoid such splits.95 The Federal Circuit ensures
uniformity—and so the Supreme Court need not.
The effect of the Federal Circuit’s creation on the Supreme Court’s
docket is striking. In the decade following the Federal Circuit’s creation, the
Court decided only five patent cases (three of which presented unusual cir-
cumstances).96 By contrast, the Supreme Court decided twelve patent cases
in the decade immediately prior.97 Several of those arose out of circuit
95. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981); S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 6 (1981); see also
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 315–317 (1971) (describing a
patent held invalid in the Eighth Circuit, but later found valid in the Seventh Circuit); Layne &
Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 388, 392 (1923) (dismissing case as
improvidently granted, explaining that “[t]here was no reason for granting the application for
a writ of certiorari except upon the ground that the . . . Fifth and the Ninth Circuits had
differed in respect to the validity and scope of the patent and that uniformity required a
decision from this Court” but ultimately concluding there was no such conflict); Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 488–91 (1979) (suggesting the Federal
Circuit would “provid[e] more uniformity of law” in view of an example wherein a patent was
held invalid in the Sixth Circuit but later found to be valid in the Western District of Penn-
sylvania); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1989) (Between “1945 [and] 1957, a patent was twice as likely to be held
valid and infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times
more likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit.”). But cf. Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (noting the possibility that such splits
may arise between judicial and administrative reviews of a patent).
96. Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. From 1982 to 1992, the
Supreme Court decided General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983), Dennison
Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam), Christianson, 486 U.S. at 803,
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), and Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). Of these five cases, the first three present special circum-
stances. First, the petition in General Motors was filed before Congress created the Federal
Circuit (and granted in OT1981), 456 U.S. 988 (1982) (granting petition on May 24, 1982),
and the case was decided only shortly thereafter (in OT1982), 461 U.S. at 650. Second, as
noted supra note 93, Christianson presented a circuit split over the scope of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s jurisdiction. 486 U.S. at 803. That is, Christianson presented a question particular to the
very statute that gave rise to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 807. Third, the Court issued a summary
disposition in Dennison, declining “to give plenary consideration to petitioner’s claim” and
preferring instead to “vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the [Federal Circuit] for
further consideration in light of [Civil Procedure] Rule 52(a).” 474 U.S. at 811.
97. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176 (1980); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,
425 U.S. 273 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974); United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706
(1972); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); see also Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette et al., Supreme Court Patent Cases, Written Description, https://writtendescrip
tion.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/64AM-CCX2].
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splits.98 The creation of the Federal Circuit—and the consequent elimination
of one key heuristic for certworthiness—temporarily tempered the Supreme
Court’s direct involvement in the development of patent doctrine.99
That effect, however, has since faded: The Supreme Court has become
“active, if not even hyperactive, in patent law.”100 Indeed, the Court decided
six patent cases—nearly ten percent of its docket—in its 2016 Term.101 This
reflects a relatively new normal. In its 2010 Term, for example, the Court
granted certiorari in six patent cases.102 So too in its 2013 Term.103
But the Federal Circuit’s uniformity-enforcing function has forced the
Supreme Court to look beyond the existence of a circuit split to determine
whether to grant certiorari. That is, the Court must rely on other signals
(beyond circuit splits) to assess a petition’s certworthiness in light of its
other institutional interests (beyond uniformity).104 The Office of the Solici-
tor General (OSG) has, as John Duffy explains, helped to serve such a signal-
ing function: Beginning in 1994, the Court turned to the OSG with
increasing frequency to help decide which patent cases to review.105 The
Court often calls for the views of the solicitor general (CVSGs) in cases that
“involve complex regulatory and statutory schemes” to determine whether
98. See, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 472; Brunette Mach. Works, 406 U.S. at 707; Deepsouth
Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 527–29, 532; see also Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 185 & n.4 (noting
“tension,” but no “direct conflict,” on the question presented).
99. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 667–68 (2009).
100. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 62–63. Since the start of OT2006, the Court has granted
certiorari in thirty-two patent cases. See Appendix Table 1.
101. Out of sixty-two merits opinions, the Court decided six patent cases: Sandoz Inc. v.
Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1523 (2017); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017);
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Life
Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017); and Samsung Electronics Co. v.
Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). If “it is an extraordinary year when [the Court] manages to
review as many as three patent cases” in one Term, Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 28, then it might
be at least doubly extraordinary that the Court decided six in this Term.
102. See Appendix Table 1.
103. See id. This recurring pattern may also address concerns that the 2016 Term was an
aberration, reflecting concerns unique to an eight-member Court (prior to Justice Gorsuch’s
confirmation).
104. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 536 (the Federal Circuit’s unique designation as the sole
arbiter of intermediate patent appeals means that the Supreme Court has “needed to find
some novel way to evaluate certiorari petitions in patent cases”); see also Shapiro et al., supra
note 28, § 4.21, at 288–89 (noting that though the Supreme Court “give[s] substantial defer-
ence to the views of the Federal Circuit,” it occasionally reviews cases “because of the intrinsic
importance of the questions presented,” and explaining that such “[i]mportance may be found
in the Federal Circuit’s treatment of patentability standards”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percola-
tion, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. Rev.
505, 510–511 (2013) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s focus on patent cases implies a
concern about the Federal Circuit’s “accuracy” in decisionmaking).
105. Duffy, supra note 8, at 526 fig.4, 531 fig.5.
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the issues presented are of “sufficient importance to merit review.”106 Be-
cause such technical matters may lie outside the Supreme Court’s core com-
petencies, it sometimes turns to the executive branch to supply additional
expertise before agreeing to hear a case.107 Some patent appeals fall inside
this set of complex cases. Cases presenting questions about substantive pat-
ent doctrine, such as KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (regarding the
nonobviousness requirement of patentability),108 have frequently been the
subject of CVSGs.109 In such cases, the OSG has usually responded with its
assessment of the importance of the case,110 and its views have often proved
persuasive. The Court, for example, granted the petition in KSR on the so-
licitor general’s recommendation (and it eventually rendered a decision that
closely mirrored the solicitor general’s favored interpretation of the patent
laws).111 Hence, the Court may rely upon the solicitor general (as well as
other amici) to help signal whether an issue is sufficiently important to the
development of substantive patent law to warrant certiorari.112
106. Thompson & Wachtell, supra note 51, at 281. Notably, the OSG will oppose certio-
rari in cases that do not, in its view, meet the standard for certiorari—even if the OSG believes
the decision below was incorrectly decided. See Ivy Amicus Brief for the United States, supra
note 67, at 8 (arguing that the “case does not warrant [the Supreme] Court’s review,” notwith-
standing the government’s belief that the Court of Appeals’ decision was incorrect, because
that decision “is fact-dependent and does not conflict with any decision of this Court, another
federal court of appeals, or a state court of last resort”).
107. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 549 (suggesting that the Supreme Court “rel[ies] on the
solicitor general’s views” to “determine importance” for certiorari purposes).
108. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
109. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 536 (“Since the 2000 Term, the Court has referred to the
Solicitor General many more certiorari petitions in patent cases than would be expected based
on either (i) historical practice, or (ii) the percentage of patent cases on the Court’s merits
docket.”).
110. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
548 U.S. 902 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 1455388 (explain-
ing that the case “presents an important question of patent law that warrants [Supreme Court]
review”).
111. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
23–24, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 04-1350) (“This Court should
not adopt [the Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation (TSM)] test . . . .”), 2006 WL 2453601, with
KSR, 550 U.S. at 402 (“[T]he TSM test is incompatible with this Court’s precedents.”); see also
Duffy, supra note 8, at 539 (showing the Court’s tendency to agree with the solicitor general’s
views).
112. Duffy, supra note 8, at 549 (suggesting that the Supreme Court “rel[ies] on the Solic-
itor General’s views” to “determine importance” for certiorari purposes); Timothy B. Dyk,
Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 Chi.-Kent
J. Intell. Prop. 67, 82 (2016); Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 29 (“[W]henever in recent years the
Solicitor General has urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a patent case, it has done
so . . . .”); see also Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.21, at 288–89 (noting that the Supreme
Court sometimes reviews patent cases because of the “intrinsic importance of the questions
presented,” and explaining that such “[i]mportance may be found in the Federal Circuit’s
treatment of patentability standards”); Cordray & Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari, supra
note 62, at 408 (“[T]he key ‘importance’ criterion for review is almost necessarily met when
the federal government seeks review . . . .”).
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Notably, however, the Supreme Court has granted review in a substan-
tial number of patent cases even without the OSG’s input. Such decisions
have often (though not exclusively) come in cases presenting patent-specific
applications of transsubstantive doctrines. For example, in Octane Fitness,
the Court agreed to consider when attorneys’ fees awards to prevailing par-
ties are appropriate in patent cases.113 It did so absent any circuit split, with-
out the OSG’s input, and without noting any other reason for the decision
to review the case.114 There is no apparent signal reflecting an established or
well-understood institutional interest to explain the Court’s decision to
grant certiorari in Octane Fitness. Indeed, in the first thirty-five Terms after
the Federal Circuit’s creation (OT1982 through OT2016, inclusive), the Su-
preme Court has agreed to review fifty-three patent cases—and it has done
so twenty-seven times with neither the input of the OSG nor the presence of
a circuit split.115 Moreover, the OSG opposed certiorari in eight of the
twenty-two cases in which it participated at the certiorari stage.116 Overall,
two thirds117 of these decisions to grant certiorari seem neither to implicate
the Court’s concerns for geographic uniformity by way of a “conflict” nor to
obviously satisfy the standard for “importance” under Rule 10 (given both
the Court’s apparent reliance on the solicitor general to signal importance in
113. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752–53
(2014).
114. See id. at 1755 (stating flatly, “We granted certiorari, and now reverse.” (citation
omitted)); see also infra note 186 and accompanying text (noting lack of other signals for
certworthiness in Octane Fitness).
115. See Appendix Table 1, which details these features of the patent-related petitions for
certiorari that were granted by the Court since the creation of the Federal Circuit. This table is
based on—and expands upon—several sources, including John Duffy’s work, see supra note 8,
at 539 fig.8, Lisa Ouellette’s list of Supreme Court Patent Cases, see supra note 97, the Supreme
Court’s own electronic docket, Docket Search, Sup. Ct. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
docket/docket.aspx [https://perma.cc/A3RG-FJM3], SCOTUSblog, see Terms, SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ [https://perma.cc/9MPT-R2RM], and the online
archive of the Office of the Solicitor General, see Office of the Solicitor Gen., Supreme Court
Briefs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/osg/supreme-court-briefs [https://per
ma.cc/LUY5-NJMD].
116. See id.
117. See Appendix Table 1. The Court issued a CVSG before granting the petition for
certiorari in fifteen cases, the United States was a party to the litigation in seven cases, and five
cases presented a circuit split. See id. Of these, the United States was a party to one case that
also presented a circuit split. See id. For these purposes, I do not consider differences between
the Federal Circuit and the approaches employed in the regional circuits before 1982 to be live
circuit splits, even though such divisions are sometimes alluded to as “splits” in petitions for
certiorari. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certorari at 9–10, Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 523 U.S.
1003 (1998) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 97-1130), 1998 WL 34081020. This is because
such “splits” do not implicate the uniformity concerns that would counsel in favor hearing
such a case: The Federal Circuit’s expansive jurisdiction means that the regional circuit’s rule
no longer applies.
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patent cases and the substantive content of many of these cases).118 Given
these metrics, many of these cases are not obviously worthy of certiorari.
The observation that the Court grants certiorari in some patent cases
that do not satisfy these benchmarks gives rise to one of the puzzles at the
center of this Article: How does the Supreme Court decide whether to re-
view a patent case? The Court’s opinions in these cases do not directly ad-
dress this certiorari-specific question, and, as noted, Rule 10 offers
practically no help. I turn instead to an alternative source—the certiorari
petitions themselves—to discern any cues that signal a case’s
certworthiness.119
III. Field Splits
The Supreme Court’s decisions to grant petitions for a writ of certiorari
in patent cases—especially those presenting questions about the application
of a transsubstantive doctrine—seem to be influenced by the existence of a
field split. That is, rather than turn to whether two courts of appeals have
decided the same issue differently, the Supreme Court considers whether
two fields of law—say, patent law and securities law—appear to apply the
same doctrine differently.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear eBay v.
MercExchange, a landmark decision—arising out of a patent context—re-
garding the standard for granting a permanent injunction.120 The case was
billed to the Supreme Court as one about the “Federal Circuit’s wooden
approach to injunctive relief.”121 Though eBay conceded that there was no
118. See Gugliuzza, supra note 15, at 331 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s recent decisions,
though substantial in number, have rarely involved the fundamental legal doctrines that di-
rectly ensure the inventiveness of patents and regulate their scope.”); see also infra text accom-
panying note 221.
119. The “cue theory” of certiorari suggests that the Court filters petitions by looking for
particular cues (i.e., features) that alert it to a case’s potential. See Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in Judicial Decision-Making 111,
118–19 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963); see also Perry, supra note 2, at 118–39. Notably, the
cue theory does not attempt to predict which petitions will be granted. Rather, cue theory
attempts to predict only those petitions that “will be studied with care.” Tanenhaus, supra at
127; see Stuart H. Teger & Douglas Kosinski, The Cue Theory of Supreme Court Certiorari
Jurisdiction: A Reconsideration, 42 J. Pol. 834, 835–36 (1980).
Discerning these cues can be of considerable value to scholars of and practitioners at the
Supreme Court. This is because “the cues are, in fact, surrogates for the salient issues.” Id. at
845. Hence, identifying a cue can help both to identify which cases are more likely to receive
the Court’s extended attention and to explain why those cases demand such attention. See also
Perry, supra note 2, at 34 (“[T]he practitioner must rely best he can upon the history of
grants and denials in the various types of cases” to discern the standard for certiorari (quoting
Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 4.3, at 264 (5th ed.
1978))).
120. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
121. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S.
1029 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 1801263 [hereinafter eBay
Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
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direct conflict among the courts of appeals in light of the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, it explained that other circuit
courts, in other contexts, would have employed a more flexible standard for
assessing the propriety of injunctive relief.122 That is, eBay contended that
patent cases are (improperly) subject to a different standard for injunctive
relief than, say, trademark cases.123 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case.124 Its unanimous opinion makes clear its focus on this alleged diver-
gence between patent law and other fields of law: “[T]he decision whether to
grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts, and . . . such discretion must be exercised consistent with
traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases
governed by such standards.”125
This pattern is apparent in many of the Court’s patent cases. In 2007,
Rebecca Eisenberg noted the Supreme Court’s proclivity to review cases that
seem to put “patent jurisprudence . . . at odds with the treatment of similar
issues in other fields of law.”126 Since then, the number of such cases has
exploded. In some, the petitioner alleges a divergence between patent law
and related intellectual property fields. In others, a petitioner highlights a
distinction with some other selected set of substantive areas. Finally, peti-
tioners sometimes allege a rift between patent law and all other fields of law.
To be sure, as described below, many petitions belie such strict categoriza-
tion: A petitioner may, for example, allege that patent law’s interpretation of
some procedural doctrine is a lonely outlier but highlight differences from
copyright law in particular. Or the Supreme Court itself may recharacterize
more broadly a split presented narrowly in the petition. Nevertheless, this
rough taxonomy captures most of the Court’s patent cases alleging field
splits and may offer useful information for assessing the likelihood that a
particular petition will (or should) catch the Court’s attention.
A. Splits Across Related Fields
Some field splits allege divisions between a practice under the patent
laws and a like practice under related intellectual property statutes. The Su-
preme Court has noted a “historic kinship between patent law and copyright
law,” for example, and has thus sometimes looked to one doctrine to guide
122. Id. at 21–22.
123. Id. at 23.
124. eBay, 546 U.S. 1029.
125. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
To be sure, some scholars have suggested that this universal standard appears to have
been made out of whole cloth. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, & Henry E. Smith, The
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev.
203, 219–32 (2012); Lee, supra note 17, at 1439. But this doesn’t bear on whether the Court
intended to impose a universal standard, whether new or “traditional.”
126. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 29.
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its decisions about the other.127 Some petitioners have drawn upon the rela-
tionship among these fields of intellectual property law to suggest that this
kinship not only allows for like treatment—rather, it demands it.
1. Laches
The Supreme Court’s decision in SCA Hygiene Products v. First Quality
Baby Products offers one such example.128 SCA Hygiene’s story begins with a
different case that was decided a few years earlier: In its 2013 Term, the
Court decided Petrella v. MGM “to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
the application of the equitable defense of laches to copyright infringe-
ment.”129 In Petrella, the Court concluded that laches “cannot be invoked to
preclude adjudication of a claim for damages” so long as the claim is within
the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations.130 The express statute of
limitations superseded the discretion conferred by equity’s laches
doctrine.131
Shortly thereafter, in SCA Hygiene, the Federal Circuit considered a
laches defense to a claim of patent infringement.132 The Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, declined to adopt Petrella’s rule.133 Citing the distinctively
“broad” and “inclusive language” of 35 U.S.C. § 282, as well as legislative
history suggesting (in the circuit court’s view) that Congress intended to
codify the then-prevailing practice of admitting laches defenses to claims of
infringement brought within the statute of limitations, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of an altogether different
statutory provision did not control its decision.134 Indeed, the Federal Cir-
cuit reasoned that substantive differences between the copyright and patent
laws explain the divergence: “Because copyright infringement requires proof
of access, a potential defendant is typically aware of a risk that it is infring-
ing . . . . In patent law, however, the calculus is different” because patent
infringement is a strict liability offense.135 That is, because the problem of
unfair surprise may be more serious in patent litigation than in copyright
litigation, equitable defenses are appropriately invoked in patent cases.
127. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19 (1984);
see also Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017) (“[T]he
bond between the two leaves no room for a rift of the question on international exhaustion.”).
128. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954
(2017).
129. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (2014) (emphasis
added).
130. Id. at 1967.
131. Id.
132. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 954.
133. Id. at 1333.
134. Id. at 1321–23 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (2012)).
135. Id. at 1330.
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SCA Hygiene sought review of the Federal Circuit’s decision to admit
First Quality’s laches defense to the infringement lawsuit. In its petition for
certiorari, SCA Hygiene emphasized the “conflict” between Petrella’s rule for
copyright cases and the Federal Circuit’s rule for patent cases.136 The petition
contended that the Federal Circuit had “create[d] a unique patent-law rule,”
and it faulted the circuit court for refusing to “conform patent law to copy-
right law.”137 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
Petrella and SCA Hygiene are critically different, notwithstanding their
superficial similarities. In Petrella, two courts of appeals had interpreted the
same statutory provision differently: The Ninth Circuit interpreted 17 U.S.C.
§ 507(b) to admit a laches defense, while the Fourth Circuit, for example,
did not.138 Hence, uniformity in federal law was at stake. The petition in
SCA Hygiene, however, presented no such conflict. The Federal Circuit’s de-
cision offered a uniform interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 286. There was no
threat that a litigant would have faced a different legal rule based on an
arbitrary geographic distinction that divides, say, Kansas City, Missouri, and
Kansas City, Kansas, into different judicial circuits. Instead, the “split” that
the Court agreed to review was between patent and copyright. Moreover,
there is no obvious indication that the Court regards the question of the
applicability of the laches defense to be an intrinsically important ques-
tion—one that would justify the Court’s attention absent a circuit split. In-
deed, the Court has denied such petitions on several occasions—including
petitions arising out of other intellectual property regimes.139
So why did the Court agree to hear SCA Hygiene? As in eBay, as well as
other cases described below, the opinion in SCA Hygiene suggests that the
Court’s certiorari decision was motivated by an interest in a universal ap-
proach to civil litigation (here, to laches defenses raised to claims brought
within the statute of limitations). The Court described the case as a “return
to a subject [it] addressed in Petrella,” and it concluded that “Petrella’s rea-
soning applies to a similar provision of the Patent Act.”140 Indeed, the opin-
ion identified a “well-established general rule . . . that laches cannot be
invoked to bar a claim for damages incurred within a limitations period
specified by Congress,” and it explained that “[p]atent law is governed by
the same common-law principles, methods of statutory interpretation, and
136. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First
Quality Baby Prods., 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 15-927), 2016
WL 324318 [hereinafter SCA Hygiene Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
137. Id. at 12, 17.
138. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1985 (2014) (comparing
the judgment on review, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.
2012), with, e.g., Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001)).
139. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
140. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 959
(2017).
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procedural rules as other areas of civil litigation.”141 Notably, the Court’s
opinion recharacterized the field split, originally presented as one primarily
between patent and copyright, as broadly implicating a rift with civil litiga-
tion practice generally.
Moreover, the Court’s opinion went even further than merely reversing
the Federal Circuit’s laches-related rule. SCA Hygiene unanimously estab-
lished a strict standard for implying a “patent-law-specific rule”: The Court
now requires a “broad and unambiguous consensus of lower court deci-
sions” in support of any such patent-specific approach.142 Because that stan-
dard was not satisfied, the general principle regarding the interaction
between laches and statutes of limitations (most recently stated in Petrella)
governed the case’s outcome, rather than any patent-specific considerations
(including those cited by the Federal Circuit).143
2. Declaratory Judgments
Similar splits seem to have motivated the Court’s decisions to grant va-
rious petitions about the application of the Declaratory Judgment Act in
patent cases. American Airlines v. Lockwood, for example, asked the Court to
consider whether the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial right applied to de-
claratory judgment actions testing the validity of a patent.144 In support of
its petition, American Airlines explained that “the Federal Circuit has cre-
ated a conflict”: “Before the Federal Circuit’s decision, the circuit courts had
uniformly held there is no right to a jury trial in actions to invalidate intel-
lectual property rights, such as trademarks or copyrights.”145 But after the
Federal Circuit’s decision, American Airlines contended, the rules for the
different fields of law now diverged.
141. Id. at 963–64 (alteration in original) (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Hughes, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
142. Id. at 964 (“In light of the general rule regarding the relationship between laches and
statutes of limitations, nothing less than a broad and unambiguous consensus of lower court
decisions could support the inference that § 282(b)(1) codifies a very different patent-law-
specific rule.”).
Notably, the Court was unanimous on this standard, and the only distinction between
the majority and dissent was whether the standard is satisfied. See id. at 971 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (disagreeing on whether there was a “settled, national consensus”).
But the Court applied a different (though not inconsistent) standard in Impression Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017), noting only “sparse and
inconsistent decisions” that are insufficient to form a basis for a practice different than the one
under copyright.
143. SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 964.
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1121
(1995) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 94-1660), 1995 WL 17048342 [hereinafter Am. Air-
lines Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
Before oral argument was scheduled, American Airlines withdrew its request for a jury
trial. The Court consequently remanded the case for trial without issuing an opinion. See Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182, 1182 (1995) (mem.).
145. Am. Airlines Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 144, at 7.
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Though the Court dismissed Lockwood as moot before hearing argu-
ment in the case,146 a similar pattern presented in other cases seeking a pat-
ent-related declaratory judgment. MedImmune v. Genentech, for example,
asked the Court to decide whether a patent licensee was required to breach
its license before seeking a declaratory judgment to test the patent’s valid-
ity.147 MedImmune, like American Airlines, explained that the Federal Cir-
cuit’s patent rules were inconsistent with the rules in other intellectual
property regimes: While the Federal Circuit required a patent licensee “to
put itself in material breach before challenging its licensor, a copyright licen-
see, for instance, may seek a declaratory judgment without any such bur-
den . . . . Non-patent licensees routinely are permitted to bring declaratory
judgment actions without first committing breaches of the licenses.”148
Here, as in SCA Hygiene, the Court’s decision to grant review does not
appear to conform to the prevailing benchmarks for certiorari. No amicus
filed a certiorari-stage brief (either in support of or in opposition to certio-
rari), and the Court did not seek the advice of the OSG. Moreover, the case
did not present any circuit split that might implicate the Supreme Court’s
usual concern for geographic uniformity. To the contrary, the Federal Cir-
cuit had established a national set of rules for declaratory judgment plain-
tiffs in patent cases. Rather, apparently concerned by the rift between patent
law’s approach and that taken elsewhere in federal law, the Supreme Court
agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. This regard for a consistent approach across substantive areas
marked the Court’s decision: The Court’s opinion set down a general rule
(as in eBay) “regarding application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to situ-
ations in which the plaintiff’s self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced
by threatened enforcement action of a private party.”149 That is, the Court’s
decision applies to all manner of private contracts—not just patent licenses.
B. Splits Across Unrelated Fields
In other cases, the Supreme Court appears to have granted petitions for
certiorari on the theory that patent doctrine conflicts with other, selected
fields of law. There is, however, little that obviously connects patent law to
these other areas. Rather, the alleged split implicates scattered doctrines—
patent law vis-à-vis consumer credit regulations, or patent law vis-à-vis em-
ployment law, for example.
1. Willfulness
The Supreme Court’s opinion for two consolidated cases—Stryker v.
Zimmer and Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics—offers an extreme example
146. Am. Airlines, 515 U.S. at 1182.
147. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120 (2007).
148. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
1169 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 05-608), 2005 WL 3067195.
149. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130 (emphasis omitted).
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of such a field split.150 Stryker and Halo asked the Court to decide when a
patent owner may receive treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, which
grants district courts wide discretion to “increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.” Such enhanced damages were histori-
cally reserved for cases of “willful” infringement, and the Federal Circuit had
imposed a two-part test for determining such infringement: The patent
owner must establish that the infringer’s actions were both objectively un-
reasonable and taken in subjective bad faith.151 Stryker’s petition for certio-
rari complained that this rigid interpretation of “willfulness” was
“inconsistent with Safeco,” a case regarding the meaning of that term as used
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).152
Besides the apparent divergence between the Federal Circuit’s interpre-
tation of historical practice under the Patent Act and the Supreme Court’s
statutory analysis of the FCRA, there was little else—in terms of the values
expressed through Rule 10—to commend the petition for certiorari. There
was, of course, no suggestion that there was a disuniform approach to § 284.
Nor did the Court call for the views of the solicitor general. To be sure, the
petition attracted the attention of Nokia and an industry trade group, the
Independent Inventor Group, each of whom filed an amicus brief in support
of the petition.153 But even the Independent Inventor Group argued in favor
of certiorari because the Federal Circuit’s “ ‘willfulness’ test . . . looks noth-
ing like the traditional tort doctrine in civil cases,” citing Safeco as one ex-
ample of the correct standard.154 Hence, this split seems to have influenced,
at least in part, the Court’s decision to grant the consolidated petitions.
Indeed, Safeco played a central (if not confusing) role in the Court’s
ultimate decision in the case: Halo defined willfulness by reference to Safeco
while simultaneously distinguishing Safeco from the patent context. On the
one hand, the Court embraced Safeco’s definition of willfulness: Both Safeco
and Halo agreed that a defendant acts willfully “if he acts ‘knowing or hav-
ing reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize’
150. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (reviewing Stryker Corp.
v. Zimmer, Inc., 837 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831
F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
151. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo
Elecs. 136 S. Ct, 1923.
152. Stryker Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 31 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 n.20 (2007)).
153. Combined Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae
Independent Inventor Groups in Support of Petitioner, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 14-1513), 2015 WL 4550364 [herein-
after Indep. Inventor Grps. Combined Motion and Brief]; Brief of Nokia Techs. Oy & Nokia
USA Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (Nos. 14-1513,
14-1520), 2015 WL 9245651.
154. Indep. Inventors Grps. Combined Motion and Brief, supra note 153, at 10–11 (citing
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)).
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his actions are unreasonably risky.”155 At the same time, the Court distin-
guished Halo from at least one aspect of Safeco: Though Safeco “explained
that . . . a showing of bad faith was not relevant absent a showing of objec-
tive recklessness” under the FCRA, this is not so for patent cases.156 Rather,
Halo explained that other, patent-specific precedents hold that “bad-faith
infringement” counts too.157 Hence, bad-faith conduct alone is insufficient
to satisfy the standard for willfulness under the FCRA, but may nevertheless
be sufficient for the purposes of § 284. The Court summarized its decision
to leave a rift between the FCRA and patent law on the meaning of willful-
ness by quoting from Safeco a statement that was omitted from all the case’s
petition-stage materials: “ ‘Willfully’ is a word of many meanings whose con-
struction is often dependent on the context in which it appears.”158
In sum, the Court appears to have granted the petition, at least in part,
in light of an apparent rift between a consumer credit statute and the patent
laws with respect to the meaning of willful conduct. But the Court’s ultimate
decision leaves a split intact. To be sure, the Court’s decision affected the
meaning of the term in the patent context—it crafted a new test for willful
infringement to replace the Federal Circuit’s previous approach—but it ex-
pressly declined to fully embrace the view it articulated under the FCRA.159
To the contrary, the Court reconciled its approach with Safeco only to the
extent that Safeco conceded that doctrinal context matters when defining
willful conduct.
2. Damages’ Causation Principle
I have already described another example of a petition that highlights
divisions with an apparently random set of substantive doctrinal areas. In
Samsung v. Apple, described earlier,160 Samsung’s petition for a writ of certi-
orari contended that the Federal Circuit’s damages rule was inconsistent
with the principles applied in select fields of law: “securities law, employ-
ment law, RICO, and the Violence Against Women Act.”161 In particular,
Samsung thought that, under the principles applied in these doctrinal areas,
it should be liable for only those losses attributable to its infringement.162
But the Federal Circuit reasoned that the patent statutes justified a design
patent–specific approach to damages.163
155. Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2007)).
156. Id. at 1933 & n.*.
157. Id. (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508
(1964)).
158. Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
159. See id. at 1935, 1933 & n.*.
160. See supra Part I.
161. Samsung Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 32–33 (citations omitted).
162. See id. at 33.
163. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
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The Supreme Court agreed to review the case.164 On closer inspection,
however, there seemed less to the alleged split than the petition asserted.
Apple and the OSG (which had not been consulted at the certiorari stage)
argued that the statute governing damages for design patent infringement
supersedes any “background principles of causation and equity.”165 The gov-
ernment, for example, contended that § 289 “provide[s] a measure of recov-
ery different from, and in many cases more expansive than, the award that
traditional causation principles would produce.”166 And Samsung eventually
“abandoned [the] theory” that damages for design patent infringement
ought to be limited to the profits attributable to its infringement.167 The
basis for the field split thus evaporated: Apple and the solicitor general con-
tended that § 289 should be read on separate terms, and Samsung waived its
argument that background principles should inform this patent-related
statute.
Once the field split had vanished, the case became significantly more
difficult. The Court could no longer simply choose between a general doc-
trine and a patent-specific rule (as in, say, SCA Hygiene).168 The Court was
instead tasked with crafting a unique, context-sensitive rule under § 289. It
declined to take this on: It “punted.”169 Indeed, the Court’s opinion declined
to describe, let alone endorse, any of the alternatives proposed by the parties
or the solicitor general.
C. Outliers
The Court has also frequently agreed to hear cases in which patent doc-
trine is an apparent outlier. That is, a patent-specific rule stands at odds
with the approach employed in nearly every other substantive field. eBay,
described above, is one such example. The petition for certiorari in eBay
contended that the Supreme Court had consistently applied a general rule
that absent an express statutory command, a plaintiff’s right to an injunc-
tion is governed by the “court’s traditional equitable discretion.”170 As de-
scribed earlier, the Court reversed the patent-specific rule in favor of “the
164. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016) (mem.) (granting
certiorari).
165. Samsung Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 33.
166. Samsung Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 41, at 15.
167. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 434 n.2 (2016) (citing Transcript of
Oral Argument at 6 (No. 15-777)).
168. See supra Section III.A.1.
169. Liptak & Goel, supra note 24; see supra note 49 and accompanying text. The Court’s
decision might be read less critically as having “disrupt[ed]” the Federal Circuit’s standard to
prevent its “ossification”—that is, the Court helped to “percolat[e]” the standard for assessing
damages under § 289. See Golden, supra note 99, at 700–01.
170. See eBay Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 19; supra notes 121–125
and accompanying text.
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traditional four-factor framework that governs the award of injunctive re-
lief.”171 Other cases follow a similar pattern.
1. The Standard of Appellate Review
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. presents one
such example.172 Allcare, a patent assertion entity (or, to use the pejorative
term, a “patent troll”), alleged that Highmark infringed its patent claiming
an “information-management system[ ].”173 The district court concluded
that Highmark did not infringe the patent and, more significantly, it deter-
mined that Allcare’s infringement claims were baseless and made in bad
faith. Indeed, the court found that the suit pursued “meritless allegations as
. . . leverage” in settlement negotiations.174 Hence, the district court awarded
attorneys’ fees to Highmark under 35 U.S.C. § 285, reasoning that Allcare’s
frivolous suit was an “exceptional case[ ]” in which it could (and should)
“award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”175
The Federal Circuit reversed.176 Notably, the Court of Appeals reviewed
de novo the district court’s determination that the case was “exceptional.”177
Such de novo review marked a sharp turn from the deferential standard that
had previously governed such appeals.178
Highmark asked the Supreme Court to review the case. Its petition for
certiorari contended that “the Federal Circuit’s decision to employ de novo
review in this case splits with every other relevant authority” (emphasis in
original).179 The petition explained that the exceptional case determination is
subject to deferential review under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which apply broadly across federal civil litigation. The petition explained,
for example, that Rule 52 “unequivocally” establishes a clear error review
standard for all questions of fact.180 Hence, the Federal Circuit had “no war-
rant” to make a patent-specific exception for exceptional case determina-
tions under § 285.181
171. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
172. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
173. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716–17, 727
n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
174. Id. at 735.
175. Id. at 738 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)).
176. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1744.
177. Id. at 1308–09.
178. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
179. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys.,
Inc., 570 U.S. 947 (2013) (mem.) (emphasis in original) (granting certiorari) (No. 12-1163),
2013 WL 1209137 [hereinafter Highmark Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
180. Highmark Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 19–20 (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
181. Highmark Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 19–20.
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Moreover, the petition contended that the Federal Circuit’s rule con-
flicted with decisions regarding the standard of review applicable to appeals
in “analogous areas of law,” including a similarly worded provision in the
Lanham Act, fee awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and
motions for sanctions under Rule 11.182 Highmark contended that the Fed-
eral Circuit’s “novel, no-deference approach” split from the practice in each
of these areas.183
Highmark’s petition highlighted some of the few cases in which the
Court granted certiorari to decide the appropriate standard of appellate re-
view. But these cases implicated the Court’s institutional interest in uni-
formity. Pierce, the case about fee awards under the EAJA, for example,
attracted the Court’s attention because of a circuit split.184 So too with
Cooter, the case about the standard of review for Rule 11 sanctions.185
Highmark’s petition, of course, could stake no claim to any such circuit
split. And no amicus supported Highmark’s petition, nor did the Court ask
the solicitor general to weigh in. Perhaps the Court’s interest in Highmark
can be explained by its interest in Octane Fitness, a companion case (de-
scribed earlier) about the meaning of the “exceptional case” standard.186 But
Octane Fitness itself can claim no circuit split, no solicitor general recom-
mendation, nor any other amicus support. Neither Highmark nor Octane
Fitness seems to satisfy the Court’s usual certiorari standards.
The Court nevertheless granted Highmark’s petition for certiorari, and,
in a curt, five-page opinion—an opinion that took longer to describe the
facts than to decide the question—it reversed the Federal Circuit’s rule
favoring de novo review.187 The opinion flatly described the “traditional[ ]”
practice of reviewing “matters of discretion . . . for ‘abuse of discretion,’ ”
and it illustrated that approach by reference to the examples cited in the
petition—the EAJA and sanctions under Civil Rule 11.188 That is, the Court
yet again granted certiorari in light of a field split—this time, on the ques-
tion of the standard of appellate review—and it decided the case in univer-
sality’s favor.
182. Id. at 23–24.
183. Id. at 21.
184. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 555 (1988) (“We granted certiorari to resolve
a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over important questions concerning the interpretation of
the EAJA.” (citations omitted)); see also Highmark Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
179, at 14–15 (citing Pierce).
185. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399–401 (1990) (describing the
circuit split).
186. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753–54
(2014).
187. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014).
188. Id. at 1748 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)).
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2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Microsoft v. AT&T offers an additional example of an outlier.189 AT&T
alleged that an aspect of Microsoft Windows, once installed on a computer,
infringed one of its patents.190 AT&T thus sought damages for every personal
computer manufactured to run the operating system.191 Notably, AT&T’s
claim for damages extended to computers manufactured outside the United
States: AT&T claimed that even where the computer’s entire manufacture
was abroad and all copies of the software were produced and installed on
foreign soil, Microsoft had “supplie[d]” the infringing software “compo-
nent” “from the United States.”192 The Federal Circuit agreed with AT&T.193
Microsoft sought certiorari. Its petition alleged that the Federal Circuit’s
decision “conflicts” with a principle “deeply rooted in th[e] Court’s juris-
prudence”: the presumption against extraterritoriality.194 In Microsoft’s
view, this “longstanding principle of American law” should preclude in-
fringement liability (under U.S. patent law) for such foreign manufac-
tures.195 Citing cases arising under the National Firearms Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, and the Sherman Act, among several others, Microsoft
contended that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to review the
Federal Circuit’s “complete disregard” of this basic and well-established
principle of statutory interpretation.196
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. And on the merits, it agreed
with Microsoft.197 Just as Microsoft’s petition contended, one portion of the
Court’s opinion explained that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
a “principle of general application” that “tugs strongly against” the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the statute.198 Turning instead to its precedents
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Sherman Act, the Court
ruled that AT&T’s remedy lay, if at all, not in the U.S. Code but in foreign
law.199 These precedents, however, are markedly different from Microsoft in
at least one respect: Smith v. United States, the FTCA case, for example,
earned certiorari “to resolve a conflict between two Courts of Appeals.”200
189. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
190. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 CIV.4872(WHP), 2004 WL 406640, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
191. See id.
192. Id. at *2–3 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012)).
193. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S.
437.
194. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 549 U.S.
991 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 403897 [hereinafter
Microsoft Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
195. Id. at 23.
196. Id. at 24, 26 & n.5.
197. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
198. Id. at 455.
199. Id. at 456.
200. 507 U.S. 197, 200 (1993).
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This patent case, however, presented no such split. Rather, the Court was
asked whether a principle of statutory interpretation applies with equal force
in the patent context. It answered affirmatively.
* * *
The examples described above illustrate three primary sorts of field
splits—splits across related fields, splits across unrelated fields, and outliers.
To be sure, the taxonomy is imperfect. SCA Hygiene, for example, was billed
to the Court as presenting a field split that primarily implicated related fields
of law: Petrella’s laches rule under the Copyright Act contrasted sharply with
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Patent Act.201 But the Court’s ma-
jority recharacterized the split as one presenting an outlier: It pit the patent
rule against a “well-established general rule” that applies broadly in civil
litigation.202 Likewise, one might read Samsung’s petition for certiorari not
as presenting a field split between patent law, on the one hand, and the
seemingly random collection of securities law, employment law, and crimi-
nal law, on the other, but rather as contending that the Federal Circuit’s
approach to damages for design patent infringement was an outlier.203 (In-
deed, Samsung appeared to pivot to that position in its merits brief—before
abandoning the argument altogether.)204 Nevertheless, this rough taxonomy
may, as elaborated below, help to illuminate the institutional values that
animate the Supreme Court’s decisions to grant petitions for certiorari
presenting field splits.
These certiorari decisions constitute a significant portion of the Court’s
patent docket, extending beyond the examples described above. In total,
twenty-one petitions for certiorari (out of the fifty-three granted since the
creation of the Federal Circuit) allege some form of a field split.205 By con-
trast, only six petitions out of a random sample of fifty-three denied peti-
tions in patent cases alleged a field split.206
201. SCA Hygiene Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 136, at 25–26 (citing Petrella
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)).
202. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 963
(2017).
203. Samsung Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 33.
204. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 434 n.2 (2016); Samsung Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 37, at 37–38.
205. See Appendix Table 1. I have coded the “Field Split” column in Appendix Table 1 by
looking for two contentions. First, has the petitioner alleged that patent law differs in some
notable respect from another field of law? Second, has the petitioner alleged that this differ-
ence is important enough to warrant the Court’s attention? If both conditions are satisfied,
then I coded the petition as having alleged a field split. I examined each petition for certiorari,
and I had a research assistant independently read and code each petition to verify my infer-
ences. We collectively revisited any petition where there was initial disagreement (n = 2).
206. See Appendix Table 2. The random sample was generated by way of the Journal of
the Supreme Court for OT1982 through OT2016, which notes every denied petition for a writ
of certiorari. See generally Journal, Sup. Ct. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/jour-
nal.aspx [https://perma.cc/LRH3-QBPY]. Each Journal’s entries were filtered for petitions aris-
ing out of the Federal Circuit, and then limited to patent cases. Petitions that were not
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For comparison, the solicitor general has participated in the petition-
stage briefing in twenty-two cases, and it has supported certiorari in four-
teen cases.207 Hence, as one facet of the Supreme Court’s patent docket, cases
presenting field splits are more significant than those presenting circuit
splits, and roughly on par with those important enough to merit review (as
advised by the solicitor general).
I take care not to overstate the claim. The Court, for example, sought
the solicitor general’s advice in Microsoft notwithstanding the field split al-
leged in the petition. Hence, such a split is no guarantee of certiorari.208
Indeed, it is not the Court’s exclusive signal for certworthiness in patent
cases.209 As in the rest of its discretionary docket, the Court considers a vari-
ety of factors—a dissent at the circuit court, a hearing en banc, amicus sup-
port for the petition, among others—when deciding whether to grant a
petition for a writ of certiorari.210 My claim is that the presence of a field
split seems to be, like a positive recommendation from the solicitor general,
one significant factor that tends to favor certiorari. Either may cue a case’s
potential for review.
Notably, there is limited overlap between these categories: The United
States was a party to only three cases presenting a field split, and the OSG
itself brought the field split to the Court’s attention in two of those cases.211
Moreover, the Supreme Court asked for the OSG’s advice in only five cases
presenting alleged field splits.212 This relatively slim intersection may suggest
that the two heuristics serve distinct functions. As noted above, the Court
often relies on the OSG for information as to whether a particular case
presents a substantive issue of patent law important enough to warrant Su-
preme Court intervention.213 But what institutional value (or defect) does
the Court’s attention to field splits reflect?
IV. Field Splits and the Supreme Court’s Agenda
The Supreme Court’s attention to field splits presents a puzzle of its
own: There is a mismatch between the conventional understanding of the
Supreme Court’s certiorari practice and its decisions to hear cases related to
available through commercial databases, such as Westlaw, were recovered from the U.S. Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration. The petitions were coded using the same criteria
as for Appendix Table 1. See supra note 205.
207. See Appendix Table 1.
208. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17–31, ParkerVision Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1507 (2016) (mem.) (denying certiorari) (No. 15-1092), 2016 WL 806894.
209. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 29–30.
210. See, respectively, Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle:
The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1445, 1454–57
(2012), and Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901,
1936–40 (2016).
211. See Appendix Table 1.
212. See id.
213. See supra note 106–112 and accompanying text.
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divergences among fields of law. Field splits do not implicate geographic
uniformity. After all, even if the Federal Circuit creates a patent-specific rule
for injunctions, that rule does not vary across jurisdictions. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s attention to certain substantively important questions, as
sometimes signaled by the solicitor general, cannot fully explain this wide
range of patent decisions: The Court does not typically grant certiorari in
cases presenting laches- or fees-related questions absent a circuit split.
Hence, the solution to the field split puzzle may lie outside the usual
interests that inform the Court’s certiorari decisions. One possibility is that
the Supreme Court’s appetite for field splits reveals a systemic defect in its
internal procedures. But an institutional concern for legal universality seems
to be a better explanation. That is, these decisions to grant certiorari are
motivated by neither a desire for uniformity across jurisdictions nor a need
to address a foundationally important question of patent law but rather an
otherwise unstated interest in general consistency across varied legal fields,
including patent law.
A. Field Splits’ Certiorari Mismatch
The Supreme Court’s focus on divergences among fields of law seems
contrary to its usual certiorari practice.
First, field splits have no consequence for the Court’s dominant concern
for geographic uniformity. The Supreme Court helps to ensure a uniform
application of federal law by resolving circuit splits—clear differences
among circuits on the same question of law. The Court thus does not typi-
cally grant certiorari to hear cases that present mere conflicts in principle.214
That is, trying to convince the Court to hear a case simply because lower
courts have “construed related but not identical statutes differently,” or be-
cause “the decision below is wrong in light of general principles,” “is almost
invariably futile.”215 Such conflicts in principle do not implicate the uni-
formity-related concerns that drive the Court’s focus on true circuit splits.
The Court’s uniformity interest is motivated by several underlying val-
ues, including ensuring equal treatment (and thereby protecting the judici-
ary’s legitimacy), facilitating predictability, preventing forum shopping, and
reducing burdens on multistate actors.216 None of these legal values are im-
plicated by field split cases. Consider, for example, the Court’s certiorari
decision in SCA Hygiene. The “split” alleged, between patent and copyright,
had no consequence for the Court’s concern for equal treatment: Even if the
Court had declined the case, all patent plaintiffs would be treated alike—
they would all be subject to the Federal Circuit’s rule.217 The Supreme
214. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
215. Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 242–43; see Ulmer, supra note 71, at 906; see
also Perry, supra note 2, at 128 (explaining that significant effort is dedicated to “trying to
determine if there is indeeed the conflict that the petition alleges”).
216. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
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Court’s concern for predictability is likewise satisfied by the Federal Circuit’s
standard, as the circuit court’s rule is the one by which every patent plaintiff
can set her clock (or filing calendar). The split between the en banc opinion
in SCA Hygiene and the Court’s opinion in Petrella cannot lead to forum
shopping.218 No matter the forum, patent plaintiffs are subject to the same
standard. Across the Court’s field split docket—the scope of the laches de-
fense, the meaning of § 289, and the standard for reviewing fee awards—
these uniformity-related concerns are hardly implicated.219 The Court’s su-
preme interest in uniformity cannot explain these certiorari grants.
Second, field splits often implicate questions that do not seem impor-
tant enough to warrant the Court’s attention—at least absent a circuit split.
Consider, again, the Supreme Court’s decision to consider the split between
copyright and patent law on the viability of laches defenses.220 The Court
does not appear to think that the applicability of laches defenses to intellec-
tual property claims is, as a general matter, an intrinsically important issue.
In cases prior to Petrella, such as Harjo v. Pro-Football, petitioners pressed
similar claims, and the Supreme Court denied those petitions for certio-
rari.221 To be sure, other vehicle problems may have prevented the Court
from hearing those previous cases.222 But these issues notwithstanding, there
is little indication that the matters presented in these field split cases—
laches, the definition of an exceptional patent case, or the standard for re-
viewing fee awards—belong in the same category as those usually presented
in the Court’s Rule 10(c) docket.223 Such cases often involve issues as the
extent to which States may lawfully regulate abortion providers, the scope of
permissible warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment, or the limits
on the federal government’s power to regulate the interstate power grid.224
218. See id.
219. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 371, 376 (2010) (“[T]rans-substantivity differs from
uniformity.”).
220. See supra Part III.A.1.
221. Compare, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–17, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
558 U.S. 1025 (2009) (mem.) (denying certiorari) (No. 09-326), 2009 WL 2953014 (arguing
that the D.C. Circuit’s laches decision “contravenes important public interest concerns” and
thus “it [is] imperative that th[e] Court grant certiorari and clarify [the] applicability of laches
in this context”), with Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 1, Harjo, 558 U.S. 1025 (2009)
(mem.) (denying certiorari) (No. 09-326), 2009 WL 3368682 (“[T]here is no circuit conflict
on whether the doctrine of laches is ever available as a defense to a petition . . . to cancel a
trademark registration . . . . [A]bsent a circuit split, there is no justification for this Court to
grant certiorari.”).
222. See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.4(d)–(h), at 247–49 (describing some
possible such vehicle problems).
223. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1989 (2003) (“[T]he perceived
importance of the issue in light of our constitutional structure and tradition” may “justify
independent review” under Rule 10(c)).
224. See, e.g., FERC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 90, at 29 (contending that
the Court should grant review in a case presenting a “question of substantial national impor-
tance” that is “unlikely to be considered by another Court of Appeals”).
1384 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1345
Though some patent cases may satisfy this standard because of their effect
on innovation policy nationwide—particularly those that, as noted above,
define the contours of patent protection and hence call out for the expertise
of the Solicitor General—it seems unlikely that, say, SCA Hygiene, Octane
Fitness, and Highmark, among others, also clear this bar.225
In sum, petitions that rest their hopes of certiorari on an alleged field
split do not appear to satisfy the Court’s usual standards for certiorari.226 In
practice, of course, most petitions assert a range of arguments. Petitioners
highlight divisions among fields of law, attempt to characterize these divi-
sions as splits between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals,
enlist amici, and try to persuade the Court of the importance of the underly-
ing doctrinal question. But where the “split” does not directly implicate geo-
graphic uniformity, where the issue presented is not obviously important
enough to independently merit certiorari, and where the case does not merit
summary reversal, all that is left is the discord between substantive areas of
law—a conflict of general principles.
B. A Process Defect Hypothesis
The Supreme Court’s attention to field splits thus invites further scru-
tiny: Why does the Court intervene when patent law’s applications of a
transsubstantive doctrine, such as laches, differ from those in another field
of law?227 One possibility may be that a defect in the Supreme Court’s proce-
dures explains its apparently misdirected appetite for such cases. This hy-
pothesis, however, does not adequately explain the Court’s certiorari
decisions in patent cases.
The Supreme Court processes petitions, at least in part, through the
“cert pool.” The seven justices that participate in the pool divide the peti-
tions and assign their law clerks to write memos summarizing each one.228
Richard Lazarus, among others, has argued that this system of distributed
and delegated screening for certiorari petitions contributes to the “capture”
of the Court’s certiorari mechanisms.229 Hence, the Court’s attention to field
225. See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 241; see also Gugliuzza, supra note
15, at 331 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s recent decisions, though substantial in number, have
rarely involved the fundamental legal doctrines that directly ensure the inventiveness of patents
and regulate their scope.”).
226. But see infra note 283 (considering the argument that the Court’s apparent concern
for universality can be framed in Rule 10’s terms).
227. Cf. Golden, supra note 99, at 672 (noting the need for “a consistent institutional
rationale . . . to justify Supreme Court review”).
228. See Adam Liptak, Gorsuch, in Sign of Independence, Is Out of Supreme Court’s Clerical
Pool, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/gorsuch-su
preme-court-labor-pool-clerks.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Justice Alito and
Justice Gorsuch are not members of the pool. Id.
229. See Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 Yale L.J.F. 89 (2009)
[hereinafter Lazarus, Docket Capture], https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/841_89m7e6cx.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2KG-2SXU]; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the
Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1508–11
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split cases—cases that do not appear to comport with Rule 10 and the values
so embedded—might, under this view, be the product of such manipula-
tion. In particular, the Supreme Court Bar may have learned “how to pitch
their cases to the law clerks” to persuade them to recommend that the Court
grant these petitions, despite falling short of the standards of the Supreme
Court Rules.230 Indeed, by casting these cases as presenting splits—echoing
those circuit splits that fall squarely within the Court’s usual uniformity
concerns—these practitioners may effectively bait the “limitations, suscepti-
bilities, and tendencies of the clerks.”231 In essence, this account suggests that
the Court’s patent docket has been “captured by an elite group of expert
Supreme Court advocates” that has learned to effectively influence (or, less
charitably, game) the Court’s internal procedures.232
As applied to the Court’s patent docket, however, this theory proves to
be incomplete in several respects. First, it inverts the typical account of the
effects of the cert pool. Cert pool recommendations are typically cautious:
Critics of the cert pool have detailed how pool memoranda authors face “a
hydraulic pressure to say no”—that is, to recommend denying petitions for
certiorari—even if doing so would “allow circuit conflicts to fester.”233
Scholars have described how these incentives cause law clerks to seek out a
variety of reasons to recommend against certiorari, including reasons related
to waiver, forfeiture, procedural posture, and the possibility of distinguish-
ing apparent splits on factual or statutory grounds.234 That is, law clerks have
strong incentives to distinguish true circuit splits from mere “conflict[s] in
principle,” including field splits.235 Hence, these dynamics yield a smaller
docket—not one that ranges beyond its well-established focus.
Moreover, this theory’s focus on the cert pool and the law clerks unduly
minimizes the role of the justices themselves. Even where law clerks can be
persuaded to recommend that the Court grant certiorari, that recommenda-
tion is strictly limited to the cert pool or to a justice.236 The decision to grant
a petition ultimately lies with the justices themselves, who are rather adept at
distinguishing true circuit splits—those that implicate the Court’s long-
standing concern for uniformity—from mere conflicts in principle.237
(2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy Matters]; see also Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Cham-
ber, Reuters (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/
[https://perma.cc/A39B-8P96].
230. Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 229, at 94.
231. See id.; Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 229, at 1525.
232. Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 229, at 89.
233. Starr, supra note 14, at 1376–77.
234. See Perry, supra note 2, at 218–20; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 82, at 631–32;
Stras, supra note 71, at 975; see also Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 242.
235. Shapiro et al., supra note 28, § 4.3, at 242.
236. See Provine, supra note 62, at 25 (noting that law clerks typically have “disavowed
influence on the Court’s review decisions”).
237. Ulmer, supra note 71, at 906 (finding “no significant correlations between claimed
conflict” (as compared to genuine conflict) “and the Court’s decisions on certiorari”).
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Finally, even if the Supreme Court Bar could effectively exploit cert pool
dynamics to gain review in a handful of cases, it is improbable that this
explanation accounts for the sheer volume of field split cases. If the Court
found that it was not truly interested in these cases or that it had inadver-
tently granted some of these petitions, then it is more likely that the Court
would have uncovered this internal defect and stopped granting review long
ago. Instead, the Court’s review in such cases appears to have accelerated.238
C. The Universality Hypothesis
The Court’s repeated decisions to grant petitions alleging a field split
thus seem to uncover an unstated institutional interest.239
One possibility is that the Court simply perceives the Federal Circuit to
be giving the wrong answers to the questions presented in these cases.240 But
for the Supreme Court to dedicate this volume of its docket to correcting
(putative) errors arising out of one circuit would be an extraordinary, unex-
plained departure from its usual practice disfavoring error correction.241
Moreover, an explanation that focuses on the likelihood of legal error would
seem to ignore the Court’s apparent attraction, described above, to field
splits in particular—as opposed to any other case where the Federal Circuit
(or another court) may have erred.
Hence, something else must account for the Court’s special attention to
this particular set of cases. That something else seems to be a certain regard
for questions related to legal universality—general consistency across sub-
stantive fields of law.
Such consistency is not preordained but rather reflects a conscious insti-
tutional choice.242 Early common law, for example, was characterized by
“substance-specific procedure,” in which practically every cause of action
demanded its own writ.243 By contrast, the Court seems now to treat the
Civil Rules (among other governing structures, such as the Administrative
Procedure Act) as transsubstantive.244
238. See Appendix Figures 1a and 1b.
239. Cf. Larsen & Devins, supra note 210, at 1958–64 (indicating skepticism for a process
defect or capture theory and preferring instead a theory that focuses on the justices’ own
priorities).
240. See Epps & Ortman, supra note 67, at 728 (“[S]plitless-but-erroneous circuit court
rulings can also result from specialized venue rules.”); cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107
Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=306
4443 [https://perma.cc/VU7X-SNMA].
241. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
242. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 1218.
243. See Marcus, supra note 219, at 381–83.
244. See id. at 401–15 (“[T]he Supreme Court has . . . refus[ed] to accept the judicial
revision of procedural rules to meet perceived substantive needs. The trans-substantivity prin-
ciple plays a starring role.”); Marcus, supra note 21, at 1207–18; see also Cover, supra note 53,
at 718.
June 2018] Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle 1387
These structures traded much of the context-sensitive direction and
case-specific discretion inherent to substance-based procedure and tradi-
tional equitable power for several benefits of their own.245 For one, they im-
proved judicial efficiency by simplifying procedure for lawyers and judges
alike. Moreover, these structures were intended to be value neutral: They do
not vary across types of plaintiff or causes of action.246 This neutrality may
also buttress the legitimacy of the judiciary, as such transsubstantivity “de-
nies judges the authority to discriminate among substantive regimes and
thus to make arguably political choices.”247
The Court takes a similarly transsubstantive approach to some of the
matters at issue in these patent cases—state of mind, rules of statutory inter-
pretation, and remedies, among others. This suggests that at least some of
these same underlying concerns—efficiency, neutrality, and legitimacy—
may also comprise the apparent concern for universality that informs the
Court’s approach to petitions for certiorari in patent cases.
At least three strands of evidence suggest that the Court’s certiorari de-
cisions in patent cases resonate with such an interest in the costs and bene-
fits of universality. First, this hypothesis comports with the Court’s patent
decisions described above, which themselves exemplify a general trend for
disciplining “patent exceptionalism.” Indeed, viewing this trend through a
certiorari lens both helps to explain a broader range of the Supreme Court’s
patent-related decisions and reveals the strength of the interest underlying
the Court’s focus on patent exceptionalism. Second, the Court’s apparent
Indeed, these governing structures appear to have been intended to be transsubstantive.
Legal theorists, such as Jeremy Bentham and Christopher Columbus Langdell, and legal re-
formers, including David Dudley Field and Charles Clark, believed that “the means for . . .
giving execution and effect to the ordinances of substantive law [should be] the same in all
cases,” and they derided the “grotesque” “net of forms” that “entangled” the courts. See, re-
spectively, e.g., 2 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure, reprinted in The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 15 (John Bowring & Richard Doyne eds. 1839); David Dudley Field, Law
Reform in the United States and Its Influence Abroad, 25 Am. L. Rev. 515, 519 (1891), and
David Dudley Field, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? Shall it
Be Wholly Reformed? 7 (1847). Universality norms thus emerged alongside the develop-
ment of the Field Code and, subsequently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, among other
transsubstantive governing structures (such as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 500 (2012)).
245. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 21, at 1177 (comparing a “discretion-conferring ap-
proach” with one that “establishes a general rule of law”); see also Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1979 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“ ‘[T]he nature of the equita-
ble,’ Aristotle long ago observed, is ‘a correction of law where it is defective owing to its
universality.’ ” (quoting Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics 99 (Lesley Brown ed., David
Ross trans., Oxford University Press 2009))); cf. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1238 (describing
“fidelity” to the antecedent substantive regime as a goal of substance-specific procedure).
246. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2067 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 982, 1013 (1978).
247. Marcus, supra note 21, at 1229–30; see also Shapiro, supra note 21, at 594–95; cf.
Scalia, supra note 21, at 1179–80.
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interest in legal universality is consistent with a more general project of ad-
dressing doctrinal exceptionalism across substantive fields of law. Finally, the
rise of the Court’s interest in universality (as indicated by patent field split
cases) coincides with personnel changes that might usher in new judicial
priorities.
1. Patent Exceptionalism
The Court’s apparent interest in consistency across legal doctrines flows
directly from its decisions in the cases described above. Recall, for example,
the Court’s decision in SCA Hygiene. There, the Court highlighted the im-
portance of general rules—“common-law principles, methods of statutory
interpretation, and procedural rules”—that apply across civil litigation.248
This view informs the Court’s approach to laches,249 as well as its approach
to the presumption against extraterritoriality (in Microsoft) and to the stan-
dard of appellate review (in Highmark),250 among others. In many (though
not all) of its field split cases, the Court supplants a patent-specific standard
with a broadly applicable rule—one that would be familiar to any judge or
lawyer, and one that is stripped of policy concerns particular to patent law.
That is, the new rule is cheap to master and to apply, and it does not favor
patent litigants vis-à-vis their counterparts in, say, a copyright case.
This universality hypothesis for certiorari thus connects to the Supreme
Court’s apparent project of reining in patent exceptionalism. The Federal
Circuit’s proclivity to craft patent-specific doctrine—and the Supreme
Court’s repeated rebuffs of these rules—has been the subject of scholarly
and popular commentary.251 Indeed, commentators have suggested that
many of the Court’s patent-related merits decisions are directed at eliminat-
ing exceptionalism (and reprimanding the Court of Appeals for producing
patent-specific doctrine).252 These studies offer some evidence that the
Court’s attention to field splits is motivated by an interest in legal universal-
ity. Peter Lee, for example, has described the “Supreme Court’s assimilation
248. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954,
963–964 (2017) (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Hughes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
249. See id.
250. See discussion supra Section III.C.
251. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 1453–61; Andrew Chung, Supreme Court and Top
Patent Court Rarely See Eye to Eye, Reuters (June 19, 2017, 7:54 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-court-patents/supreme-court-and-top-patent-court-rarely-see-eye-to-eye-
idUSKBN19A34I [https://perma.cc/A9UF-4Q3Y] (“Duke University law professor Arti Rai
said the high court seemed to disapprove of treating patent law differently from other areas of
law.”); see also Epps & Samuel, supra note 15, at 56:45–57:30 (interviewing William Jay, Part-
ner, Goodwin Procter LLP, who explains that the Supreme Court’s recent patent cases do not
present questions of “hardcore patent law” but rather focus on questions of “procedure,”
“venue,” and “statutory interpretation”); id. at 58:30–59:15 (noting a recent “theme” in the
Court’s patent cases “about applying ordinary rules from every other context”).
252. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 1458.
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of patent law to general legal principles.”253 The universality hypothesis of-
fers additional context for these projects in several ways.
First, the Court’s attention to field splits begins at the certiorari stage.254
The Supreme Court’s willingness to grant certiorari on these terms alone is
itself noteworthy. Recall that the Court does not typically grant certiorari to
simply correct a court of appeals’ error.255 A decision to craft a given legal
rule may be wrong—but that does not mean that it is certworthy. But the
Court seems to think that a decision to a craft an exceptional legal rule—one
that seems out of place when compared to similar rules in other fields of
law—merits a place on its docket. The universality hypothesis explains the
Court’s attention to one sort of petition for certiorari (or one sort of risk of
legal error). The Court thus appears to have a significant, heightened inter-
est in the balance between exceptionalism and universality. Indeed, this con-
cern seems (at least in the patent context) analogous to its interest in
uniformity: When a case piques either, certiorari appears more likely.
But, as described above, a successful petition does not guarantee success
on the merits. In Samsung v. Apple, for example, the Court declined to adopt
the causation standard that Samsung initially advanced.256 Similarly, as in
Halo and Stryker, the Court’s rule for willfulness does not readily conform
to the approach it has taken in other areas of law, including the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.257 These varied results suggest also that the Court is inter-
ested not simply in reining in exceptionalism but in the more general ques-
tion of how to balance universal rules with substance-specific standards.
This focus on the certiorari stage thus helps to explain a wider range of
the Court’s patent decisions, including those that may seem, at first blush,
outside the antiexceptionalism trend. Consider Kappos v. Hyatt.258 Hyatt is
typically excluded from discussions of patent exceptionalism. But like the
cases described in Part III, Hyatt, a case about district court review of a
Patent and Trademark Office decision to deny a patent application under 35
U.S.C. § 145, fits the mold.259 The government’s petition for certiorari em-
phasized background principles of administrative law, arguing that these
rules, which do not expressly contradict § 145, should govern the scope of
the district court’s review.260 The Supreme Court, however, “reject[ed] the
[government’s] contention that background principles of administrative law
govern the admissibility of new evidence.”261 That is, the Court ultimately
253. Id. at 1453–61.
254. See supra Part III.
255. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
256. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016); see supra Part I, Section
III.B.2.
257. See supra Section III.B.1.
258. 566 U.S. 431 (2012).
259. Hyatt, 566 U.S. at 435.
260. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–16, Kappos v. Hyatt, 564 U.S. 1036 (2011)
(No. 10-1219) (mem.) (granting certiorari), 2011 WL 1336431.
261. Hyatt, 566 U.S. at 438.
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determined—as it apparently did in Samsung v. Apple—that a patent-spe-
cific statute granted some license to stray from generally applicable back-
ground legal principles.262
The Supreme Court has a strong interest in universal rules—so much so
that it is willing to dedicate rare space on its docket to cases implicating such
questions. Moreover, the Supreme Court is surely less interested than the
Federal Circuit in preserving exceptional status for patent law. But it does so
on occasion. This suggests that the Court’s motives range beyond a bare
desire to discipline a Court of Appeals or even an interest in eliminating
exceptionalism altogether. Rather, the Supreme Court seems genuinely in-
terested in the question of how much patent exceptionalism to accept, seek-
ing some balance between context-sensitive adjudication and the efficiency,
neutrality, and legitimacy benefits conferred by universal legal rules. This
subtle interest informs its review of petitions for a writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
2. Antiexceptionalism Across Fields
The Court also expresses this interest in its merits decisions in other
parts of its docket. These decisions thus offer further evidence of an institu-
tional interest in legal universality (even if it is not, at least in these contexts,
expressed at the certiorari stage263).
The Court’s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States,264 for example, appears to reject the notion of “tax
exceptionalism” or “tax myopia.”265 In Mayo Foundation, the Court unani-
mously brought IRS and Treasury Department regulations back into the fold
of mainstream administrative law, finding “no reason why [its] review of tax
regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to
the same extent as our review of other regulations.”266 It rejected the argu-
ment that tax was, at least in this regard, special. And scholars have further
262. Another aspect of the Court’s decision, however, comports with general administra-
tive law principles. Once the Court concluded that the reviewing court may admit new evi-
dence, general principles of administrative law would suggest that the court should not defer
to the agency’s decision, but rather, should review the decision de novo. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(F) (2012) (allowing for “trial de novo by [a] reviewing court”). Indeed, the Supreme
Court notes that applying a “de novo standard” in this context would “adhere[ ] to . . . the
ordinary course of equity practice and procedure.” Hyatt, 566 U.S. at 444–45 (quoting But-
terworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 61 (1884)). Hence, the government and the
Court both sought to apply a universal rule. But they disagreed as to which rule should apply,
as the government’s position was predicated on the belief that the reviewing district court may
not admit new evidence.
263. See infra notes 317–319 and accompanying text.
264. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
265. See, respectively, Hickman, supra note 18, at 108–10, and Caron, supra note 18. For
additional commentary on tax exceptionalism, see also, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking
the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 466 (2013), and Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J.
Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 221 (2014).
266. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 56.
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explained that Mayo Foundation seems to have sounded tax exceptionalism’s
death knell.267
Other scholars have noted a similar trend in the immigration context,
finding that “the Court’s recent cases suggest that [it] may be moving to-
ward reviewing immigration cases under a general administrative law frame-
work, moving away from its traditional treatment of immigration law as an
‘exceptional’ area of law.”268 The Court also doubled down on its decision in
eBay, ending exceptional rules for injunctions under environmental stat-
utes.269 And in its first landmark decision on the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, the Court rejected the federal government’s arguments in
favor of health care exceptionalism.270
These examples offer further evidence of an institutional concern for
legal universality: The Court appears to view a variety of matters, including
those related to administrative and judicial process, state of mind, statutory
interpretation, and remedies, as susceptible to universal rules. The breadth
of the expression of this value situates the Court’s patent jurisprudence
within a more general framework, connecting this part of the Court’s patent
docket with decisions arising out of tax, health care, and immigration,
among others.271 Indeed, this suggests that the Court’s certiorari decisions in
patent cases implicate institutional interests beyond its suspicion of the Fed-
eral Circuit or any particular interest in patent law.272 These certiorari deci-
sions resonate with a more fundamental universality-centered value that
animates the Court’s decisions across a variety of fields and that even in-
forms the Court’s approach to the Federal Rules.273
267. See, e.g., Hoffer & Walker, supra note 265, at 222–24.
268. Rana, supra note 18, at 356; see also id. at 321& nn.39–40 (citing Hiroshi Motomura,
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1361, 1363 (1999)) (“The Court appears to be moving away from what has been called ‘immi-
gration exceptionalism’ and is instead increasingly placing immigration cases into a larger
public law framework. In other words, the Court appears to be moving immigration cases
more firmly into the mainstream of administrative law.”).
269. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20–24 (2008).
270. Moncrieff, supra note 18, at 559.
271. Cf. Rana, supra note 18, at 357–58 (linking the demise of immigration exceptional-
ism to the demise of tax exceptionalism).
272. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar
of Patents, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 273, 282–83; cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court
Concerned with Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, or Both: A Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16
Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 313, 314–15 (2017); Lee, supra note 17, at 1453–55.
To be clear, these considerations may also influence the Court’s decision to grant certio-
rari. But even if the Supreme Court exhibits some suspicion of the Federal Circuit or general
interest in patent law, the Court’s apparent interest in universality may help explain the pat-
tern described in this Article. That is, universality helps explain why the Court granted the
petitions discussed in Part III, instead of any other of the myriad petitions for a writ of certio-
rari to the Federal Circuit.
273. See Marcus, supra note 219, at 410–13 (describing the role of the transsubstantivity
principle to the Supreme Court’s “[c]onstruction of the Federal Rules”); Elizabeth G. Porter,
Pragmatism Rules, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 123, 124, 171–72 (2015); cf. Cover, supra note 53, at
718.
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3. New Priorities for a New Court
The apparent rise of this interest in universality also appears to correlate
with changes on the Court that can usher in new judicial priorities. The vast
majority of patent-related field splits admitted onto the Court’s docket had
their tickets punched after the start of the 2005 Term.274 This timing of the
move towards field split patent cases is significant: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito assumed the bench in the Court’s 2005 Term.275 This personnel
change may explain the Court’s swift shift to cases implicating universality
concerns: New justices bring to the bench their own “individual subjective
notions of what is important or appropriate for review.”276 Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito may have particular preferences favoring legal
universality that have since informed the Court’s practice.
This would not be the first time that a change in personnel has occa-
sioned a shift in patent-related practices and priorities. The Court’s 1994
Term marked both a “significant turning point” after which patent cases
comprised a more significant portion of the Court’s agenda as well as the
start of the Justice Breyer’s tenure on the Court.277 John Duffy has suggested
that “Justice Breyer’s appointment in 1994 appears to be at least partly re-
sponsible for the Court’s increased number of certiorari grants in patent
cases.”278 Analogous shifts in patent-related practices (among other areas of
law), based on individual preferences, appear to have recurred throughout
the Court’s history.279
Examples from beyond patent law seem also to follow the pattern.280 In
the immigration context, for example, scholars have explained that “the
Roberts Court has consistently applied conventional methods of statutory
274. See Appendix Figures 1a and 1b. Appendix Figures 1a and 1b are graphic representa-
tions of the “Field Split” column in Appendix Table 1.
275. Current Members, Sup. Ct. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies
.aspx [https://perma.cc/EJW2-MV69].
276. Cordray & Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda, supra note 62, at 318 (quoting Gress-
man, supra note 62, at 255 ).
277. Duffy, supra note 8, at 523–24.
278. Id. at 525; see also I. Glenn Cohen, Essay in Honor of Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Make
it Work!: Justice Breyer on Patents in the Life Sciences, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 428 (2014)
(“Justice Breyer has become the patent law judge on the Court.”).
279. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 387, 393–94 (detailing examples, dating to Justice Story in 1818, of how “the Supreme
Court’s role in patent law . . . may be defined significantly through the sensibilities of one
dominant justice”); see also Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 7, at 265–74 (considering “how
newly confirmed Justice Sonia Sotomayor will impact the Supreme Court’s view on intellec-
tual property rights and patent enforcement”); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining
Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 Const. Comment. 151, 161 (2010)
(“[T]here is no question that membership changes had some influence on the . . . Supreme
Court’s plenary docket.”).
280. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 18, at 1903 (“The [Roberts] Court has increas-
ingly jettisoned exceptionalism” in various foreign-relations-related areas).
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interpretation and doctrines of administrative deference.”281 Moreover, Chief
Justice Roberts decided to author the opinion in Mayo Foundation, the tax
case described earlier.282 These shifts towards universality across doctrinal
areas may thus be a product of the Roberts Court.
* * *
The Court’s attention to field splits at the certiorari stage seems mis-
matched with conventional understandings of the Court’s certiorari prac-
tices and the scope of Supreme Court Rule 10. The timing of the Court’s
swing towards petitions alleging field splits suggests that the shift in practice
may have been informed by the priorities of the Court’s newest members
(rather than, say, a process defect related to the cert pool). The nature of a
field split, the content of these petitions for certiorari, the Court’s opinions
in these patent cases, and its decisions in other doctrinal areas all suggest
that the Supreme Court’s agenda is partially driven by an interest in
universality.283
V. Universality and Certiorari
The solution to certiorari’s patent puzzle appears to lie in an institu-
tional concern for universality that is triggered by petitions that allege a field
281. Johnson, supra note 18, at 111; see Rana, supra note 18, at 356.
282. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 46 (2011); see
also supra notes 265–267 and accompanying text.
283. Some readers might object to my characterization of universality as a stand-alone
certiorari concern that is not incorporated in Rule 10. Some readers might, for example,
counter that the Court’s decisions to hear these cases are consistent with Supreme Court Rule
10(c)’s proviso favoring certiorari when a court “has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” But see Golden, supra note 99, at
672 (“[C]laims of a square conflict often constitute little more than rhetorical posturing.”).
Even if this were true, what about these cases would make the Federal Circuit’s decision incon-
sistent with the Court’s preexisting jurisprudence? The answer is universality—the view, ap-
parently endorsed by the Court, that certain doctrines ought to be applied consistently
regardless their doctrinal context. This is not a necessary outcome: One could easily imagine a
legal system where, say, the same procedural doctrine takes on context-sensitive features. Cf.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 & n.2 (2016). The “conflict” exists
only because the Court has decided to extend its jurisprudence in one field of law to the patent
context.
Likewise, other readers might suggest that the Court’s decisions to hear these cases are
consistent with Supreme Court Rule 10(c)’s proviso that certiorari may be warranted when a
court of appeals “has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court.” If this were true, what about these cases would make them so
“important” as to warrant the Court’s attention? The answer, again, seems to be an institu-
tional interest in universality. These cases only present “important questions” because the
Court has decided that the consistent, cross-doctrinal application of certain procedural doc-
trines is “important.” Hence, universality seems to be at issue—regardless whether it is under-
stood to be outside the conventional view of Rule 10’s ambit or comfortably within Rule 10’s
existing ambiguities.
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split.284 This hypothesis, however, raises further questions about the nature
of the Court’s universality interest.
The first is a practical concern: Taking the Court’s interest in universal-
ity as given, when will (and when should) it grant certiorari? Recall that the
Court is not interested in merely eliminating exceptionalism altogether.
Rather, it aims to strike a balance between universal rules and doctrine-
specific standards. It is thus not immediately evident which field splits will
implicate the Supreme Court’s implicit institutional interests and which
splits the Court will countenance. But a closer look may help reveal which
petitioners are more likely to succeed, both at the certiorari stage and on the
merits.
The second is a more foundational concern: Is universality an appropri-
ate lodestar for certiorari-stage decisionmaking? Unlike geographic uniform-
ity, the Court’s apparent interest in legal universality is not connected to any
congressional grant of discretionary jurisdiction. Moreover, many of these
universality-implicating cases do not “involv[e] the fundamental legal doc-
trines that directly ensure the inventiveness of patents and regulate their
scope.”285 The Court may thus wish to reconsider—or at least better ex-
plain—its certiorari standard.
A. Assessing the Court’s Certiorari Decisions
The Court’s decisions on the merits offer some clues as to which peti-
tions resonate (and which do not) with its interest in advancing universality.
Where the Court leaves patent-specific doctrine in place, it has done little to
promote either uniformity or universality. We can thus assess the Court’s
certiorari decisions by examining its opinions on the merits to discern which
cases belonged on the Supreme Court’s docket and which may not have
been worth the candle.
The Court’s willingness to entertain patent-specific doctrine suggests
that efficiency is not its leading concern. Moreover, the Court’s willingness
to countenance such divergences in field splits marked by a patent-specific
statute or preexisting doctrinal variation aligns with a regard for neutrality
and legitimacy. The Court thus seems more likely to intervene where it finds
an outlying procedural doctrine or a common policy concern across related
fields of law.
1. Outlying Procedural Doctrines
Outliers—especially those that implicate matters of procedure—seem to
characterize the core of the Court’s concern for legal universality. Indeed,
transsubstantivity scholars have noted that the Court is especially concerned
284. Put in the terms of cue theory, universality is a “salient issue” for which a field split is
a reliable “cue.” Supra note 119 (quoting Teger & Kosinski, supra note 119, at 845).
285. Gugliuzza, supra note 15, at 331.
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for universality in these contexts to preserve neutrality (as well as institu-
tional legitimacy through impressions of neutrality) and to promote judicial
efficiency.286
Consider SCA Hygiene. This case was, as noted, originally billed to the
Court as a split among related fields—between the Federal Circuit’s patent
rule and the Court’s copyright decision in Petrella.287 But the Court
recharacterized the split as an outlier: in its view, the patent rule for laches
conflicted with a “well-established general rule.”288 The Court emphasized
patent law’s membership in the club of civil litigation, all “governed by the
same common-law principles, methods of statutory interpretation, and pro-
cedural rules.”289 The Court’s decision to grant certiorari thus seems aligned
with its interest in advancing a universal set of standards for litigation prac-
tice in general and procedure in particular.290
2. Common Concerns Across Related Fields
SCA Hygiene’s petition for certiorari also helps to explain Justice
Breyer’s dissent. Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer did not appear to view
the case as presenting an outlier. Rather, he characterized the split as the
petitioners originally did. In his view, the majority’s best argument was for
“consistency” between the Copyright Act and the Patent Act.291 Here, the
majority and dissent wrote past each other. Justice Alito’s majority opinion
focused on the broad structures governing civil litigation while Justice
Breyer’s dissent explored the intricacies of intellectual property law.292 On
these terms, Justice Breyer was unpersuaded: He noted several “relevant dif-
ferences . . . between patent law and copyright law.”293 He explained, for
example, that copyright plaintiffs must prove wrongful intent on the part of
the defendant, while patent infringement is a strict liability offense.294 Unfair
surprise is thus more likely in patent disputes, and so equitable defenses,
such as laches, may be appropriately invoked given the context.295
286. See Marcus, supra note 219; Marcus, supra note 21.
287. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
288. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 963
(2017).
289. Id. at 963–64 (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods.,
LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Hughes, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-
part)).
290. See e.g., Marcus, supra note 219, at 410–13 (describing the Court’s “particular con-
cern for the legitimacy of court-crafted procedural rules” in which a “trans-substantivity prin-
ciple plays a starring role”).
291. SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 971 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
292. Compare, e.g., supra note 289 and accompanying text, with infra notes 293–295 and
accompanying text.
293. SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 971 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 972.
295. Id.
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Justice Breyer’s dissent thus highlights one important limit on the set of
field splits consistent with the Court’s interest in legal universality: Splits
among related fields merit review only where the split regards a matter of
concern common to these distinct fields (here, of intellectual property).
There was, in Justice Breyer’s view, no common concern with copyright to
warrant consistent treatment.296
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. offers a contrast-
ing example.297 Impression Products asked the Court to consider whether a
patentholder may exercise her rights against a secondhand owner—that is,
after the patented product has been resold.298 The Court faced a similar
question in the copyright context a few Terms earlier. There, it had decided
against the copyright holder, holding that the copyright is statutorily ex-
hausted by the first sale of the protected product, even if that sale is executed
abroad.299 Impression Products’ petition for certiorari noted a split between
patent and copyright on this question and urged the Court to align the ap-
proaches among these related fields.300 Lexmark and, more notably, the so-
licitor general argued the contrary: Copyright, the OSG said, “does not
illuminate the proper international-patent-exhaustion rule.”301
The Court sided against Lexmark and the OSG, noting a concern for
patent law’s effects on copyright policy:
296. Id. at 971–73. This “common concern” limit to the Court’s interest in consistency
across related fields of law also relates to the Court’s decision to decline to hear the first
question presented in Samsung’s petition, described supra Part I. Recall that this petition sug-
gested “tension” among fields of intellectual property law on the proper scope of protection
for design patents. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. But if the Court believes that
these distinct regimes have distinct scopes of protection—see, for example, Christopher Buc-
cafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1298–1306 (2017), noting
the consequences of allowing IP regime scopes to overlap; Mark P. McKenna & Christopher
Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 491, 540–42 (2017), discussing how IP regimes interact to create coherent,
or incoherent, incentive frameworks thereby shaping investment and innovation; Pamela Sam-
uelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, 92 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1493, 1513–16 (2017), noting the consequences of allowing IP regime scopes to
overlap—then this argument may have had little sway. That is, in the Court’s view, such
tension is a natural product of these distinct intellectual property regimes, and thus does not
require harmonization.
297. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). In addition to Impression Products, see also Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 13, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239
(2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 16-712), 2016 WL 6995217 (noting split between
patent and copyright and explaining that the two are “indistinguishable . . . in this regard”).
298. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1536.
299. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 528–30 (2013).
300. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24–27, Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 15-1189), 2016 WL 1130030
[hereinafter Impression Prods. Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
301. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21–22, Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct.
546 (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 15-1189), 2016 WL 5957534 [hereinafter Impression
Prods. Amicus Brief for the United States]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Reversal in Part and Vacatur in Part at 30, Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (No. 15-
1189), 2017 WL 371923.
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Differentiating the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines
would make little theoretical or practical sense: The two share a “strong
similarity . . . and identity of purpose,” and many everyday products—
“automobiles, microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and per-
sonal computers”—are subject to both patent and copyright protections.
There is a “historic kinship between patent law and copyright law,” and the
bond between the two leaves no room for a rift on the question of interna-
tional exhaustion.302
That is, the Court’s decision in this patent case is informed by a copyright
statute and the related fields’ “historic kinship”—notwithstanding the ab-
sence of an analogous patent statute.303 Notably, this may give courts of ap-
peals other than the Federal Circuit a measure of power over patent law’s
path: Where copyright and patent intersect, a court’s decision in the former
may ultimately affect the latter.
These examples help to illuminate the interest that informs the Court’s
agenda-setting decisions in its patent docket. In some cases, the decision to
grant review implicates the Court’s interest in preserving the judiciary’s sta-
tus as a neutral litigation forum. Indeed, where the Federal Circuit is seen to
be captured,304 the Court’s imposition of universal, value-neutral rules offers
a restraint on apparent patent activism. I do not mean to suggest that the
Federal Circuit is in fact captured—but what matters, at least for the pur-
poses of the Court’s apparent legitimacy concern, is the perception of cap-
ture. The Court’s interventions thus help to assure that the judiciary is not
seen as discriminating among related fields of law, such as patent and anti-
trust,305 or patent and copyright, among others.306 Hence, as a purely practi-
cal matter, petitioners seeking certiorari may thus find better success by
highlighting outlying procedural (and procedure-like) doctrines and by not-
ing incongruence between rules in related fields of law.307
3. Variation Among Unrelated Fields
In other cases, by contrast, the Court seems to eventually admit a degree
of inconsistency across fields of law. In Stryker, for example, the Court
302. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1536 (cleaned up).
303. Impression Prods. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 300, at 24–27; cf. Impres-
sion Prods. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 301, at 21–22 (noting lack of an
analogous patent statute).
304. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from
the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 787, 789–90 (2010). But cf. id. at
790–91.
305. See Feldman, supra note 17, at 66–71.
306. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 787, 808 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court occassionally
appears impatient with the [Federal Circuit] for not . . . changing the law to conform to
decisions on related issues.”); cf. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238
(2014).
307. Except, perhaps, as described infra Section V.A.3.
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maintained a patent-specific approach in light of existing doctrinal varia-
tion. As described above, Stryker complained that the Federal Circuit’s defi-
nition of “willfulness” was “inconsistent with Safeco”308—without
acknowledging that Safeco itself noted that “ ‘willfully’ is a word of many
meanings whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it
appears.”309 The Court’s decision ultimately acknowledged Safeco’s view on
the meaning of willfulness and crafted a patent-specific approach. To be
sure, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit, finding the previous test “un-
duly rigid.”310 But Justice Breyer’s concurrence explained that the Court’s
new patent-specific approach should be shaped by “the Federal Circuit[’s]
. . . own experience and expertise in patent law.”311 Given the Court’s will-
ingness to countenance a patent-specific approach informed by patent-spe-
cific concerns (as articulated by the Federal Circuit), the Court’s decision to
grant certiorari seems questionable. The Court did little to advance either
uniformity or universality, preferring instead to preserve a standard respon-
sive to doctrinal context.
The examples implicating patent-specific statutes present a special case
of such context sensitivity. The petition in Samsung, for example, alleged a
split on damages principles, but the Court seems to have eventually agreed
with the OSG that 35 U.S.C. § 289 “provide[d] a measure of recovery differ-
ent from, and in many cases more expansive than, the award that traditional
causation principles would produce.”312 Such examples, which also include
Hyatt,313 highlight patent-specific statutes that, in the Court’s ultimate view,
may supersede an otherwise applicable background principle.
The Court’s practice further illuminates the contours of the underlying
values that form its apparent concern for universality. The Court’s willing-
ness to admit doctrinal variation suggests that efficiency is not its primary
concern. After all, the Court could have easily construed § 289 to include a
causation limit, simplifying the statute’s remedy to the standard applied in
other fields of law. Rather, where the Court can explain distinctions among
substantive regimes by reference to statutory text, it seems to prefer context-
sensitive adjudication.314 That is, where doctrinal variation may not threaten
the judiciary’s neutrality or legitimacy by, say, embodying policy choices
clearly made by the courts (rather than ascribed to Congress), the Supreme
308. Stryker Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 31 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 n.20 (2007)).
309. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 n.* (2016) (quoting Safeco
Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
310. Id. at 1932.
311. Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring).
312. See supra Part I.
313. See supra notes 258–262 and accompanying text.
314. But see Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 Akron L. Rev. 1189, 1194 (2010) (noting the “judiciary’s re-
fusal to acknowledge that statutory procedure is legitimate”).
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Court is more responsive to the differences among fields of law and benefits
of context-sensitive adjudication.315
This pattern has clear implications for practice. Opponents to a petition
for certiorari may thus wish to pay careful attention to existing doctrinal
variation and patent-specific statutes. Where these factors—common in
splits among random fields, as in both Halo and Stryker as well as Sam-
sung316—explain the alleged field split, the Court is more likely to let a pat-
ent-specific rule stand. It should do so at the certiorari stage by simply
denying the petition and declining to review the case.
B. Assessing the Court’s Certiorari Standard
The Court’s decisions to review patent cases presenting an outlying pro-
cedural doctrine or a conflict with a related field of law on a matter of com-
mon concern seem consonant with the apparent scope of its interest in
universality. Should the Court agree to review nonpatent cases under such
circumstances too? There is no obvious indication that it has granted review
in a nonpatent case on such terms.317 Patent cases may thus appear to oc-
cupy a privileged place in the Supreme Court’s certiorari practice. Consider
the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Mayo Foundation. That tax case,
described earlier, presented a new circuit split created by judgment on re-
view.318 But the field split at issue—an outlying standard for reviewing tax
regulations vis-à-vis other regulations—was much older than this circuit
split. The Court might have addressed the field split sooner, if it were a cue
for certiorari across doctrinal areas.319
But it might not have. Indeed, the Court’s apparent disinterest in re-
viewing field splits beyond patent law may highlight some important weak-
nesses in this apparent certiorari standard.
315. Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L.
Rev. 1155, 1159 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,”
2009 Wis. L. Rev. 535, 562; Cover, supra note 53, at 718.
316. The inference does not, of course, run both ways. Alleged splits among random fields
are susceptible to being explained by general doctrinal variation or patent-specific statutes. But
these factors may also be present in other types of splits. Hyatt, for example, was billed to the
Court as an outlier, but may be explained by a patent-specific statute. See supra notes 258–262
and accompanying text.
317. There is, of course, room for a more robust exploration of this question via, say, an
examination of petitions for certiorari arising out of the other circuit courts, or petitions
arising out of other fields of law—such as tax or immigration—where exceptionalism appears
to have been a concern, see supra Section IV.C.2, or even petitions arising out of other aspects
of the Federal Circuit’s docket, see supra note 3. I hold such further study for future work,
noting only that in several nonpatent cases that sound in universality, the Court’s field split
review seems to be triggered by a circuit split. That is, in these other areas of law, the Court
seems content to let the field split fester—at least until it gives rise to a circuit split. See, e.g.,
infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 264–267 and accompanying text.
319. See Hickman, supra note 18, at 108–10; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little
Bit Special, After All?, 63 Duke L.J. 1897, 1909 (2014).
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For one, the Court’s attention to, say, the application of the laches de-
fense in patent cases or the standard of review for fee awards in such cases, is
not connected to any usual basis for certiorari. As described earlier, these
sorts of questions do not seem to implicate the Court’s longstanding, tradi-
tional function of deciding “important question[s] of federal law.”320
To be sure, the Court has heard cases presenting questions such as these,
as in Petrella, or Cooter & Gell and Pierce.321 But these cases implicated the
Court’s uniformity-enforcing function: The Supreme Court addressed cir-
cuit splits. And the Court’s focus on geographic uniformity is founded in
the 1925 Judges’ Bill, in which the Court implicitly traded with Congress a
promise to ensure geographic uniformity in federal law for greater discretion
over its own docket (in the form of certiorari).322 But there is no analogous
congressional basis for the Court’s focus on legal universality. To the con-
trary, Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit may suggest that the Court
ought to take extra care before agreeing to review a patent case. After all, the
Federal Circuit was created to supplement—if not supplant entirely—the
Supreme Court’s uniformity-enforcing function in patent cases.323
But while the Federal Circuit was created to ensure uniformity in patent
decisions, that says little about the authority to resolve important questions
of patent law. Such questions remain in the Supreme Court’s purview. In-
deed, consistent with Rule 10(c), the Court should review important patent
law questions. Instead, the Court’s present focus may divert its attention
from cases presenting important patent law questions in need of resolution.
Though the Court agreed to review five patent cases in its 2015 Term, it
declined to hear Sequenom—despite the presence of over twenty certiorari-
stage amicus briefs, a separate panel opinion, and divided opinions on the
petition for rehearing en banc.324 The Court’s docket is a limited resource,
320. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c); see also supra notes 221–225 and accompanying text.
321. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
322. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Hartnett, supra note 66, at 1685,
1697–98 (2000).
323. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981) (explaining that “there are areas of the law in
which the appellate courts reach inconsistent decision[s] on the same issue” but “the Supreme
Court’s capacity to review cases cannot be enlarged significantly” and so “the remedy lies in
some reorganization at the intermediate appellate level”). Indeed, some early petitions for
certiorari concede that “restraint in reviewing Federal Circuit decisions on patent law is appro-
priately grounded in the confidence that . . . the Federal Circuit has authoritatively settled a
question of patent . . . in light of its accumulated expertise in the area . . . .” Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit at 19, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 516 U.S. 1145 (1996) (mem.) (granting certiorari)
(No. 95-728). Notably, now-Judge Taranto (of the Federal Circuit) co-authored this petition.
See also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1938 (2016) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (noting the importance of “the Federal Circuit[’s] . . . own experience and expertise in
patent law”).
324. Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (mem.) (denying
certiorari). For these indicia of certworthiness, see, respectively, Proceedings and Orders, Sup.
Ct.  U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-1182.htm
[https://perma.cc/LN2S-AHYD]; Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
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and its bandwidth for patent cases is surely even more constrained. And
though it is impossible to say why the Court denied Sequenom’s petition,
these resource constraints may have limited the Court’s attention for an im-
portant and potentially foundational case. If the Court is to hear a case
where there is a chance that the Federal Circuit erred, it should hear a case
where the risk of error regards a foundationally important patent law is-
sue—not laches.
I should state clearly the scope of my critique. I do not mean to suggest
that universality should not inform the Court’s merits decisions. But as a
standard for certiorari, legal universality seems dissonant with the tradi-
tional and congressional bases for the exercise of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.325 And it may distract the Court from matters in greater need of
its attention. To be sure, the Court may see the values informing its apparent
interest in universality—neutrality and institutional legitimacy—as suffi-
cient for certiorari.326 But if that is so, the Court should more clearly explain
why. And it should explain why these values take on added importance in
the patent context vis-à-vis, say, its tax docket. Or else it should agree to
review field splits across any doctrinal areas. Stated simply, if the Supreme
Court cannot clearly articulate the values informing a decision to grant cer-
tiorari, then, perhaps, it should decline to review the case.
* * *
The Court’s interest in universality thus seems a bit fainthearted. This is
so along at least two dimensions. First, the Supreme Court’s commitment to
consistency across fields falters in the face of existing doctrinal variation or a
patent-specific statute. This, of course, is not given: The Court could have
announced a transsubstantive standard for willful conduct in Halo and
Stryker, and it might have read a causation limit into the text of § 289 in
Samsung v. Apple. I do not mean to suggest that the Court should necessarily
adopt a stronger (or weaker) form of universality in its merits decisions.327
But either approach has consequences for the path of the law. A further shift
toward universality might buttress the gains in efficiency, neutrality, and
legitimacy that existing transsubstantive rules have wrought, while a shift
away might better protect the courts’ ability to take context- and case-spe-
cific considerations into account. The Supreme Court’s choice along this
spectrum will affect jurisprudence in patent, tax, and immigration cases,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809
F.3d 1282, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehear-
ing en banc); and Sequenom, 809 F.3d at 1293 (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for reharing en banc).
325. Cf. The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961) (The
Supreme Court “is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions.”).
326. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c); see also supra note 283. Indeed, legitimacy is sometimes cited
as one value served by a geographically uniform interpretation of federal law. See supra note 81
and accompanying text.
327. I plan to address this in future work.
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among others. It will also set the tone for lower courts—nationwide and in
all areas of law—either pushing them toward decisions based upon universal
standards or upon case- and context-specific features.
Second, the Supreme Court’s interest in legal universality appears at its
apex in the patent context. In other doctrinal areas, the Court’s universality
value plays no obvious part in a case’s first act, coming on stage only after
review has been granted. This seems odd and may highlight some important
weaknesses in the Court’s standard for granting review. As a basis for certio-
rari, universality has no apparent foundation in either the Court’s tradi-
tional practice or congressional grants of discretionary jurisdiction. And the
Court’s focus on field splits directs its docket away from questions closer to
the core of patent doctrine. Perhaps the Court sees the values underlying its
interest in universality as equally urgent. But the Court has not explained
why that is so, and why it is especially so in its patent docket. Hence, if the
Court cannot articulate the basis for review in these cases, it may be better
served by reserving its focus for questions in greater need of its limited
attention.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s patent docket presents a puzzle. In the vast major-
ity of its docket, the Court emphasizes circuit splits—cases that implicate the
Court’s oft-noted role in ensuring the uniform application of federal law. In
another corner of the Court’s docket, it focuses on fundamental questions of
constitutional design, federal power, and national policy. But many of the
Court’s patent cases fit neither description. The Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals ensures uniformity in patent law. And many
recent patent cases implicate neither constitutional questions nor core pat-
ent doctrine. How, then, does the Court decide which patent cases to hear?
My hypothesis is that the Court is motivated by an institutional concern
for legal universality: The Supreme Court seems concerned about consis-
tency across fields of law. Such consistency helps to ensure a neutral and
legitimate judicial forum. This interest triggers review in cases presenting
field splits—allegations that patent law somehow stands apart from other
areas of law in some important respect. This theory is consistent with the
petitions for certiorari in these cases. It is consistent with the mode of the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in these patent cases, and its decisions in other
areas in its docket. And the timing of the Court’s interest in such cases coin-
cides with the investitures of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who
may have a special interest in such universality.
The Supreme Court’s apparent interest in universality has important
strategic implications for both petitioners and respondents—in both patent
cases and beyond. The petitions for certiorari (and opinions on the merits)
in the Court’s patent docket suggest that petitioners ought to highlight out-
lying procedural doctrines and discord with related fields of law. Opponents
to certiorari may likewise find success by highlighting existing doctrinal va-
riation and patent-specific statutes that supersede background principles.
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Moreover, the Court can quickly address any outstanding questions re-
garding its standard for certiorari. It could, for example, amend Rule 10 to
clarify the standard for certiorari in patent cases, setting out a rationale for
review. But even if the Court is loath to set out a patent-specific standard in
this general rule of practice (or otherwise amend the rule at all), an even
easier answer awaits: The Court can describe the basis for certiorari in its
merits decisions. As I noted earlier, the Court sometimes describes the rea-
son for certiorari in its opinions. In Petrella, Safeco, Pierce, Cooter, and
Smith—all cited above—the Supreme Court described the uniformity-re-
lated rationale for agreeing to review the case. But it has not offered a similar
service in its patent docket. Correcting this anomaly is simple. Consider the
following addition to the Court’s opinion in SCA Hygiene:
SCA [Hygiene] appealed to the Federal Circuit, but before the Federal Cir-
cuit panel issued its decision, this Court decided Petrella. The panel never-
theless held, based on a Federal Circuit precedent, A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., that SCA’s claims were barred by laches.
The Federal Circuit then reheard the case en banc in order to reconsider
Aukerman in light of Petrella. But in a 6–to–5 decision, the en banc court
reaffirmed Aukerman’s holding that laches can be asserted to defeat a claim
for damages incurred within the 6–year period set out in the Patent Act. As
it had in Aukerman, the en banc court concluded that Congress, in enact-
ing the Patent Act, had “codified a laches defense” that “barred recovery of
legal remedies.” . . . We granted certiorari [in light of the conflicting ap-
proaches to the defense of laches among patent law and other areas of law].328
Such a straightforward description of the basis for certiorari (regardless
whether it reflects universality or some other value) will help the academy
better understand the Court’s institutional values, will help the Supreme
Court Bar better identify cases that resonate with the Court’s concerns, and
will help the Court itself avoid cases that do not merit its limited attention.
Indeed, if the Court cannot articulate such a basis for certiorari, then per-
haps it should never have agreed to hear the case at all. That is, the Supreme
Court can help itself find the cases it will want to decide—in patent law, and
beyond.
328. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954,
959–60 (2017) (cleaned up and modified to describe a basis for the grant of certiorari).
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1: Certiorari Grants in Patent Cases
(OT1982–OT2016)
C a s e  N a m e 
T e rm  C e rt . 
G ra n te d  
P e tit io n  fo r  W r it o f C e r tio rar i 
S G  a  P a rty ?  C V S G ?  C o u rt  S p lit?  F ie ld  S p lit?  
D e n n is o n  M fg . C o . v . P a n d u it  C o rp .  O T 1 9 8 5      
C h ris t ia n s o n  v . C o lt  In d u s . O p e ra t in g  C o rp .  O T 1 9 8 7    Y   
B o n ito  B o a ts , In c . v . T h u n d e r C ra f t  B o a ts , In c . O T 1 9 8 7    Y   
E li L illy  &  C o . v . M e d tro n ic , In c .  O T 1 9 8 9      
C a rd in a l C h e m . C o . v . M o rto n  In t ’l, In c . O T 1 9 9 2      
A s g ro w  S e e d  C o . v . W in te rb o e r  O T 1 9 9 3      
A m . A ir lin e s , In c . v . L o c k w o o d  O T 1 9 9 4     Y  
M a rk m a n  v . W e s tv ie w  In s tru m e n ts , In c . O T 1 9 9 4      
W a rn e r-J e n k in s o n  C o . v . H ilto n  D a v is  C h e m . 
C o .  O T 1 9 9 5   
   
P fa f f  v . W e lls  E le c s ., In c . O T 1 9 9 7      
D ic k in s o n  v . Z u rk o  O T 1 9 9 8  S    Y  
F la . P re p a id  P o s ts e c o n d a ry  E d u c . E x p e n s e  B d . 
v . C o lle g e  S a v . B a n k  O T 1 9 9 8   
  Y  
J .E .M . A G  S u p p ly , In c . v . P io n e e r H i-B re d  In t ’l, 
In c . O T 2 0 0 0   O  
 Y  
F e s to  C o rp . v . S h o k e ts u  K in z o k u  K o g y o  
K a b u s h ik i C o .  O T 2 0 0 0   
   
H o lm e s  G rp ., In c . v . V o rn a d o  A ir  C irc u la t io n  
S y s ., In c . O T 2 0 0 1   
  Y  
M e rc k  K G a A  v . In te g ra  L ife S c ie n c e s  I , L td . O T 2 0 0 4   S    
I ll. T o o l W o rk s , In c . v . In d e p . In k , In c . O T 2 0 0 4    Y   
e B a y  In c . v . M e rc E x c h a n g e , L .L .C . O T 2 0 0 5     Y  
L a b . C o rp . o f  A m . H o ld in g s  v . M e ta b o lite  L a b s . , 
In c . O T 2 0 0 5   O  
  
M e d Im m u n e , In c . v . G e n e n te c h , In c .  O T 2 0 0 5     Y  
K S R  In t ’l C o . v . T e le f le x , In c . O T 2 0 0 5   S    
M ic ro s o f t C o rp . v . A T & T  C o rp .  O T 2 0 0 6   S   Y  
Q u a n ta C o m p u t. , In c .  v . L G  E le c s ., In c .  O T 2 0 0 6   S    
B ils k i v . K a p p o s  O T 2 0 0 8  O     
G lo b a l-T e c h  A p p lia n c e s , In c . v . S E B , S .A .  O T 2 0 1 0     Y  
B d . o f  T rs . o f  th e  L e la n d  S ta n fo rd  J u n io r U n iv . 
v . R o c h e  M o le c u la r S y s ., In c .  
O T 2 0 1 0   S    
M ic ro s o f t C o rp . v . i4 i L td . P ’s h ip  O T 2 0 1 0      
M a y o  C o lla b o ra t ive s  S e rvs . v . P r o m e th e u s  
L a b s , In c .  
O T 2 0 1 0      
C a ra c o  P h a rm . L a b s . v . N o vo  N o rd is k  O T 2 0 1 0   S    
K a p p o s  v . H y a t t O T 2 0 1 0  S    Y  
G u n n  v . M in to n  O T 2 0 1 2    Y   
B o w m a n  v . M o n s a n to  C o . O T 2 0 1 2   O    
A s s ’n  fo r M o le c u la r P a th o lo g y  v . M y ria d  
G e n e t ic s , In c . 
O T 2 0 1 2      
F T C  v . A c ta v is , In c . O T 2 0 1 2  S   Y   
M e d tro n ic , In c . v . M iro w s k i F a m ily  V e n tu re s , 
L L C  
O T 2 0 1 2     Y  
O c ta n e  F itn e s s , L L C  v . IC O N  H e a lth  &  F itn e s s , 
In c . 
O T 2 0 1 3     Y  
H ig h m a rk , In c . v . A llc a re  H e a lth  M g m t. S y s ., 
In c . 
O T 2 0 1 3     Y  
L im e lig h t  N e tw o rk s , Inc . v . A k a m a i T e c h s ., In c . O T 2 0 1 3   S   Y  
N a u t ilu s , In c . v . B io s ig  In s tru m e n ts , In c . O T 2 0 1 3      
A lic e  C o rp . v . C L S  B a n k  In t ’l O T 2 0 1 3      
T e va  P h a rm s . U S A , In c . v . S a n d o z , In c .  O T 2 0 1 3     Y  
C o m m il U S A , L L C  v . C is c o  S y s ., In c . O T 2 0 1 4   S   Y  
K im b le  v . M a r ve l E n tm ’t , L L C  O T 2 0 1 4   O    
H a lo  E le c s ., In c . v . P u ls e  E le c s . , In c ;  
S try k e r C o rp . v . Z im m e r, In c . 
O T 2 0 1 5     Y  
C u o z z o  S p e e d  T e c h s ., L L C  v . L e e  O T 2 0 1 5  O     
S a m s u n g  E le c s . C o . v . A p p le  In c .  O T 2 0 1 5     Y  
S C A  H y g ie n e  P ro d s . A k t ie b o la g  v . F irs t  Q u a lity  
B a b y  P ro d s ., L L C  
O T 2 0 1 5     Y  
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L ife  T e c h s . C o rp . v . P ro m e g a  C o rp .  O T 2 0 1 5   S    
T C  H e a rt la n d  L L C  v . K ra f t  F o o d s  G rp . B ra n d s  
L L C  O T 2 0 1 6      
Im p re s s io n  P ro d s ., In c . v . L e x m a rk  In t ’l, In c . O T 2 0 1 6   S   Y  
S a n d o z  In c . v . A m g e n  In c .  O T 2 0 1 6   S    
S A S  In s t ., In c . v . L e e  O T 2 0 1 6  O     
O il S ta te s  E n e rg y  S e rvs ., L L C  v . G re e n e ’s  
E n e rg y  G rp . , L L C  O T 2 0 1 6  O    Y  
 
O — O S G  O p p o s e d  R e v ie w . S — O S G  S u p p o rte d  R e v ie w . Y — Y e s .
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Appendix Table 2: Field Splits in Denied Petitions
(Random Sample, OT1982–OT2016)
C a s e  N a m e 
T e rm  C e rt . 
D e n ie d  
P e tit io n  fo r  W r it o f C e r tio rar i 
F ie ld  S p lit?  
N e s t ie r C o rp . v . M e n a s h a  C o rp .  O T 1 9 8 4   
R o l M fg . C o . v . N ic k s o n  In d u s ., In c . O T 1 9 8 5   
W o o d s  v . T s u c h iy a  O T 1 9 8 5   
M o r-F lo  In d u s ., In c . v . S ta te  In d u s ., In c .  O T 1 9 8 7   
C a lc o , L T D . v . W a te r T e c h s . C o rp .  O T 1 9 8 8   
C o n s ta n t  v . A d va n c e d  M ic ro -D e v ic e s , In c . O T 1 9 8 8   
S ta g n e r v . U .S . P T O  O T 1 9 8 9   
H a la s  v . Q u ig g  O T 1 9 9 0   
P o m in i In c . v . F a rre l C o rp . a n d  U .S . In t ’l T ra d e  
C o m m ’n  O T 1 9 9 1  Y  
S h a t-R -S h ie ld , In c . v . T ro ja n , In c .  O T 1 9 9 2   
In te l C o rp . v . U L S I S y s . T e c h ., In c . O T 1 9 9 3   
M e n d e n h a ll v . C e d a ra p id s , In c .  O T 1 9 9 3   
S u n b u rs t  P ro d s . , In c . v . C y rk  In c . O T 1 9 9 6   
A d va n c e d  S e m ic o n d u c to r A m ., In c . v . A p p lie d  
M a te r ia ls , In c . O T 1 9 9 6   
O in e s s  v . W a lg re e n  C o .  O T 1 9 9 6   
C A T  C o n tra c t in g , In c . v . In s itu fo rm  T e c h s ., In c . O T 1 9 9 6   
S tu n -T e c h , In c . v . R .A .C .C . In d u s ., In c .  O T 1 9 9 8   
K a ra v a n  T ra ile rs  v . M id w e s t  In d u s . O T 1 9 9 9   
S ig n -A -W a y , In c . v . M e c h tro n ic s  C o rp . O T 2 0 0 0   
A m . Im a g in g  S e rvs . v . In te rg ra p h  C o rp .  O T 2 0 0 0  Y  
C o n s ta n t  v . U .S . P T O  B d . o f  P a te n t  A p p e a ls  &  
In te r fe re n c e s  O T 2 0 0 1   
K im b e rly -C la rk  C o rp . v . T y c o  In t ’l (U S ), In c . O T 2 0 0 1   
D o w  C h e m . C o . v . A s tro -V a lc o u r, In c .  O T 2 0 0 1   
O ra n g e  B a n g , In c . v . J u ic y  W h ip , In c . O T 2 0 0 2  Y  
T h o m a s o n  v . M o n s a n to  C o .  O T 2 0 0 2   
A rro w  C o m m c ’n  L a b s  v . E a g le  C o m tro n ic s  O T 2 0 0 2   
T h e  T o ro  C o . v . W h ite  In d u s . O T 2 0 0 4   
C a te rp illa r  In c . v . S tu rm a n  In d u s .  O T 2 0 0 4   
In t ’l R e c t if ie r C o rp . v . S a m s u n g  E le c s . C o .  O T 2 0 0 5   
R o s s  v . S ta te  C o n tra c t in g  &  E n g ’g  C o rp .  O T 2 0 0 6   
B ru c k e lm y e r  v . T .H .E . M a c h in e  C o . O T 2 0 0 6   
B e n d e r v . D u d a s  O T 2 0 0 7   
S a in t-G o b a in  C a lm a r, In c . v . A rm in a k  &  A s s o c .  O T 2 0 0 7   
C a p ita l B r id g e  C o . v . IV L  T e c h s . L T D . O T 2 0 0 7   
A lp h a p h a rm  P ro p rie ta ry  C o . v . T a k e d a  C h e m . 
In d u s ., L T D . O T 2 0 0 7   
A c u s h n e t C o . v . C a lla w a y  G o lf  C o m p a n y . O T 2 0 0 9   
M ic ro s o f t C o rp . v . L u c e n t T e c h s . O T 2 0 0 9  Y  
S A P  A G  v . S k y  T e c h s . O T 2 0 0 9   
M e ttk e  v . K a p p o s  O T 2 0 0 9   
B a d e n  S p o rts , In c . v . M o lte n  U S A , In c . O T 2 0 0 9   
K o z a c h u k  v . M e d p o in te  H e a lth c a re , In c .  O T 2 0 1 0   
W o n g  v . U n ite d  S ta te s  O T 2 0 1 0   
L o c k w o o d  v . S h e p p a rd , M u llin , R ic h te r &  
H a m p to n , L L P .  O T 2 0 1 1  Y  
A p o te x , In c . v . O ts u k a  P h a rm . C o   O T 2 0 1 2   
D it to  v . U .S . P T O  O T 2 0 1 2   
H y u n d a i, M o to r A m ., In c . v . C le a r w ith  C o m p s ., 
L L C  O T 2 0 1 3  Y  
W ilk in s  v . G e n . E le c . C o .  O T 2 0 1 4   
P u ls e  E le c s ., In c . v . H a lo  E le c s . , In c .  O T 2 0 1 5   
B o d u m , In c . v . M e y e r In te lle c tu a l P ro p s . O T 2 0 1 5   
N e e v  v . A lc o n  L e n s x , In c . O T 2 0 1 6   
C o x  C o m m c ’n s  v . S p rin t  C o m m c ’n   O T 2 0 1 6   
M a c D e rm id  P rin t in g  v . E .I . D u P o n t d e  N e m o u rs  
&  C o . O T 2 0 1 6   
T D E  P e tro le u m  D a ta  S o ls ., In c . v . A K M  E n te r. , 
In c . O T 2 0 1 6   
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Appendix Figure 1a: Certiorari Grants in Field Split Patent Cases












































Appendix Figure 1b: Certiorari Grants in Field Split Patent Cases
Since 1982 (Displayed Cumulatively)
 
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
20
16
